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established. Common EU-Nordic Arctic conferences could enhance long-term cooperation between 
various programmes. 
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The study Arctic Europe: Bringing together the EU Arctic Policy and Nordic 
cooperation was produced as a part of a project "Suomen puheenjohtajuus arktisessa 
neuvostossa kasvaneen epävarmuuden aikakaudella" (Finland's Arctic Council chairmanship 
in the times of increasing uncertainty). The project is funded by the Finland's Prime Minister's 
Office as part of the Government’s analysis, assessment and research activities (2016). It is 
implemented jointly by the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland, the Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs and the Marine Research Centre of the Finnish Environment Institute. 
The authors of the report are based at the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland. 
 
The Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland is a national and international research 
centre of excellence and hosts the world’s leading Arctic experts. It conducts high quality 
local, regional and international research on the Arctic, trains experts on Arctic issues, and 
conveys information and research results concerning the region. The research blends the 
perspectives of the natural and social sciences, and the Centre’s multidisciplinary research 
groups study the social and environmental impacts of global climate change, as well as 
sustainable development, Arctic anthropology, and environmental and minority law in the 
region. The research is highly transdisciplinary and carried out throughout the whole of the 
Arctic region as well as in the Antarctic. 
The Centre’s high standards and up-to-date research results benefits science and 
administration as well as informs political decision making and management of various social 
and environmental problems. One essential aspect of the Arctic Centre’s work is to convey 
scientific information. The Centre aims to increase knowledge and awareness based on 
sound scientific information and in this way support sustainable development, environmental 
protection and social, cultural and biological diversity in the Arctic and the High North. 
The University of Lapland, the northernmost university in Finland and in the European 
Union, focuses on Arctic issues, primarily in the area of humanities, social science, law and 
social welfare. 
Adam Stępień is a political scientist at the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland. His 
broad research interests include: policy coherence, Arctic governance, law and cooperation, 
Arctic indigenous governance, participatory decision-making, as well as development 
cooperation partnerships.  Adam took part in a number of projects on the EU-Arctic nexus. 
Adam is Polish but has lived in Lapland for the last seven years. 
Professor Timo Koivurova is a director of the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland. His 
expertize covers, among others, Arctic legal and governance questions, international 
environmental law and indigenous rights. He is one of the key scholars dealing with the Arctic 
regional cooperation, including in particular the Arctic Council. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study considers how the European Union’s Arctic Policy stemming from the Joint 
Communication of 27 April 2016 on “The integrated EU policy for the Arctic” can productively 
interact with Nordic cooperation frameworks in order to support developments in Arctic 
Europe.  
Compared to earlier Arctic policy documents, the 2016 Joint Communication has a clearer 
emphasis on the issues specific for the European Arctic. In particular, it focuses on 
sustainable economic growth in the region and launches a process of identifying key 
investment and research priorities. Correspondingly, in recent years Finland, Norway and 
Sweden adopted Arctic strategies, which are partly dedicated to the development of Nordic 
states’ northern areas. The Arctic dimension is central also to regional development 
strategies adopted by Europe’s northernmost regions. In turn, Nordic intergovernmental and 
cross-border cooperation has been tackling development challenges in North Calotte region 
for decades, and currently Arctic-related questions receive particular attention within Nordic 
venues.  
In light of these policy processes, the northernmost regions of Finland, Sweden and Norway 
(or North Calotte region) can be described as “Arctic Europe”, an integral and indispensable 
part of the socio-economic landscape of the European Union and the European Economic 
Area. The use of the term “Arctic Europe” also postulates policy developments, cross-border 
cooperation and investments that could further strengthen the connections of the region to 
European markets, value chains, technological changes and social developments.  
Apart from linkages to the European population centres, a number of studies (most notably, 
the 2015 “Growth from the North” report) suggest that the region’s potential could be better 
utilized through making Arctic Europe more integrated internally. This is to be done via the 
elimination of border obstacles, emergence of pan-regional business activities, and common 
strategic planning.  
The 2016 Joint Communication lists a variety of spaces for EU involvement and launches 
several potentially relevant initiatives. This study identifies how opportunities that are opened 
or highlighted in the 2016 Joint Communication could contribute – in alignment with Nordic 
cooperation – to the strengthening of Arctic Europe’s position as a distinct, vibrant, 
indispensable and stable part of Europe’s socio-economic landscape. Three aspects are here 
marked out: 
 Identifying key common themes of the EU Arctic policy and the Nordic cooperation 
(SYNERGIES). 
 Utilizing the EU-Arctic Stakeholder Forum process to formulate a common strategy 
for Arctic Europe, with the participation of Nordic cooperation forums (STRATEGY 
AND COORDINATION). 
 Clarifying how developments taking place in Arctic Europe are important for the rest 
of the continent, as well as highlighting areas where the region can be made even 
more relevant for European stakeholders (IMPORTANCE). 
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SYNERGIES: Common themes of Nordic cooperation and the EU’s Arctic 
policy for Arctic Europe 
The EU’s support for the developments in Arctic Europe could be the strongest not within 
extractive sectors, which commonly receive most attention in the discussion on Arctic 
development, but through the EU’s contribution to innovation, the bioeconomy (including the 
blue economy), cold climate technologies, low-carbon solutions, and e-services. These are 
also growth areas where Nordic cooperation forums have been particularly active in the 
recent years. Aligned EU and Nordic actions in these sectors could bring benefits to the 
region in terms of high-quality jobs, economic diversification and human development. In 
addition, creative industries and developments in traditional industries (reindeer herding, 
handicrafts) should be supported, also because the latter are central to Sámi culture and 
identity. 
The Nordic Council of Ministers is currently working on the new Arctic Cooperation 
Programme for 2018-2021, possibly aiming at supporting a broader spectrum of economic 
opportunities in the Arctic (highlighting opportunities beyond large-scale resource extraction). 
Bioeconomy, circular economy, climate technologies and digitization are among such growth 
areas. This creates the opportunity for alignment with the EU-Arctic Stakeholder Forum 
process, which is likely to emphasize similar development trajectories for Arctic Europe.  
These sectors have the potential to generate technologies that could be deployed in 
European rural areas and across the Circumpolar Arctic. As such technologies enhance 
European innovation, the EU support for development and commercialization of innovative 
solutions could also take the form of loans for higher-risk investments. 
Nordic cooperation venues could facilitate networks and projects on circular economy 
solutions suitable for peripheral, sparsely populated regions. These include small-scale 
circular technologies for remote Arctic communities, as well as systems for material and 
waste flows spanning across Arctic Europe. Building on these networks, proposals for EU 
investment financing and programmes, including Interreg and Horizon 2020 (or its 
successors) could be developed. 
Currently, the Nordic bioeconomy strategy is being prepared and the EU Bioeconomy 
Strategy is being reviewed. A degree of cooperation in drafting these documents could be 
beneficial for both the Nordic Council of Ministers and the European Commission. These 
strategies should have a strong Arctic dimension with consideration for Arctic-specific 
challenges, including the impacts from climate change.  
Nordic states would like to enhance the process of scaling up Nordic low-carbon solutions. 
Deploying low-carbon technologies is particularly challenging in remote Arctic communities. 
Therefore, national, EU and Nordic support is needed to develop feasible low-carbon options 
for sparsely populated areas. Arctic regions could also serve as testbeds or incubators for 
new technologies. Projects disseminating successful Nordic solutions across Europe and the 
Arctic would contribute to the global and European climate goals. 
The European Investment Bank could consider following the example of the Nordic 
Investment Bank and secure a pool of resources for Arctic-specific projects. Actors from 
across Europe could be involved in these investments. Possibilities for joint financing of key 
Arctic projects by the Nordic and EU financing institutions could be also considered. 
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Further EU-Nordic cooperation in tackling border obstacles should be encouraged. Nordic 
and EU mechanisms for reviewing new legislation from the point of view of unintended new 
border obstacles could be developed, with consideration for the special characteristics of 
sparsely populated areas. 
Both the EU and Nordic cooperation institutions should contribute to enhancing trans-border 
cooperation among the Sámi. Notwithstanding whether the Nordic Sámi Convention is 
ratified, the EU should continue strong support for those Sámi projects, which facilitate joint 
activities across borders.  
STRATEGY AND COORDINATION: EU-Arctic Stakeholder Forum as a catalyst 
for a common Arctic Europe strategy 
The emergence of Arctic Europe as a distinct and vibrant region would be enhanced by the 
formulation of a common strategic development plan, postulated by a number of recent 
reports and studies. The 2016 Joint Communication launched the EU-Arctic Stakeholder 
Forum (ASF), which aim is to identify key investment and research priorities. This opportunity 
could be utilized as a stepping stone for the future Arctic Europe common strategy, which 
could be co-developed and co-owned by Nordic states, regions, the EU, as well as Nordic 
intergovernmental and cross-border cooperation institutions. Such common investment 
priorities would have to be then reflected in regional, national and EU policies and 
programmes. 
The development of an Arctic Europe common strategy has to be driven by the Arctic Europe 
regions. Such a framework should not take the form of a macro-regional strategy, similar to 
those established for other large European regions. Instead, elements of the smart 
specialization concept can be applied, as they appear particularly suitable for the 
developmental circumstances prevalent in remote, sparsely populated areas. One way is to 
facilitate emergence of trans-border business and research clusters. 
Among the key aspects of the strategy should be ideas for improving the position of Arctic 
Europe’s economic actors within European and global value chains. Key investment and 
research priorities, and ultimately a common strategy, should highlight the areas where Arctic 
Europe has the greatest innovation potential, and where solutions and technologies 
developed can be deployed outside the region. That includes cold climate technologies, low-
carbon solutions, e-services, and circular solutions. 
Mechanisms promoting Arctic Europe’s common priorities across programmes and policy-
making need to be put in place, if such priorities are not to remain a wish-list. 
One such mechanism could be an Arctic Europe Seed Money Facility. The facility would 
support the drafting of project proposals, which contribute to promoting key Arctic investment 
and research priorities within any of the EU or Nordic programmes. Set up under one of the 
EU funding programmes, the facility would support networking, project preparation or pre-
feasibility studies. A joint Nordic-EU seed money facility covering all funding sources in Arctic 
Europe should be considered. National, Nordic and regional funding should contribute to the 
budget of such a facility. 
In order to facilitate exchange between Nordic forums (in particular the NCM and the relevant 
cross-border committees), expanding the idea – included in the 2016 Joint Communication – 
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of annual stakeholder conferences into a joint EU-Nordic Arctic meetings should be 
considered. 
IMPORTANCE: Enhancing Arctic Europe’s importance for the rest of continent 
While the 2016 Joint Communication acknowledges the importance of Arctic Europe for the 
rest of the continent, the region’s multidimensional relevance for European economic and 
social actors can be further promoted and strengthened. European actors need to be 
convinced that the whole EU benefits from the socio-economic development of Arctic Europe. 
The region provides Europe with non-renewable and renewable resources, including 
renewable energy. Arctic Europe is also a space for innovative technologies, business 
opportunities, governance solutions, as well as non-material values of nature and culture.  
Arctic Europe is a region well-suited for development, testing and deployment of a variety of 
technologies, including cold-climate technologies, innovative bio-products, small-scale 
circular solutions, and e-services. This already benefits European technology developers. 
Positioning the region as a European testbed could make it easier for Arctic Europe 
companies to find niches in global and pan-Arctic markets. It would also boost sustainable, 
low-carbon innovation in the EU. Solutions oriented towards sparsely populated or rural areas 
can be tested in the region and then scaled up to the European level or shared across the 
Circumpolar Arctic. Arctic Europe’s solutions, technologies and services should be promoted 
as benchmarks for environmentally sustainable and socio-economically feasible 
developments in sparsely populated and Arctic regions. Many Arctic regions, including 
Lapland, already utilize and promote these opportunities. 
Low population density could be an asset in the European context as regards experimenting 
with innovative governance solutions. Northernmost regions are likely to be flexible in 
applying policy measures and there is interest in the concept of a living lab among Arctic 
Europe policy-makers.  
The active role of the EU in development of vibrant societies and economies in Arctic Europe 
would enhance the EU’s soft power in collaboration with Russia and in the perception of the 
EU as an Arctic actor. Arctic Europe would stand as an example that the EU’s policies, single 
market, standards and values contribute to sustainable, diversified and inclusive Arctic 
development. In light of increasing concentration of development in cities, successful 
sparsely populated areas can also serve as one of spearheads for pan-European rural 
revival, which is key to pan-European long-term economic and social stability and equity.  
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LIST OF ACRONYMS  
AACA Adaptation Actions for a Changing Arctic 
ACP Arctic Cooperation Programme (Nordic Council of Ministers) 
ARC Arctic Regional Cooperation 
ASF EU-Arctic Stakeholder Forum 
BEAC Barents Euro-Arctic Council 
CAFF Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (working group of the Arctic 
Council) 
DG REGIO European Commission’s Directorate General for Regional Policy 
ECONOR Economy of the North (project and report) 
EEA European Economic Area 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EFSI European Fund for Strategic Investments 
EIB European Investment Bank 
ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument 
ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (before 2014) 
ESIF European Structural and Investment Funds 
EU European Union 
EUSBSR EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
ICT Information and Communication Technologies 
NCM Nordic Council of Ministers 
ND Northern Dimension 
NEFCO Nordic Environment Finance Corporation 
NIB Nordic Investment Bank 
NORA Nordic Atlantic Cooperation 
NPA Interreg Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme 2014-2020 
NPP Northern Periphery Programme (until 2013) 
NSC Nordic Sámi Convention 
NSPAs Northern Sparsely Populated Areas network 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PAME Protection of Arctic Marine Environment (working group of the Arctic 
Council) 
SAON Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks 
SDWG Sustainable Development Working Group (Arctic Council) 
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SLCFs Short-lived Climate Forcers 
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises 
TEN-T Trans-European Network for Transport 
UNDRIP UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
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INTRODUCTION 
The study considers how the EU Arctic Policy stemming out of the 2016 Joint Communication 
of 27 April 2016 on “An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic”
1
 can support positive 
developments in Arctic Europe and how it can productively interact with the diverse Nordic 
cooperation frameworks operating in the region.  
Considering Nordic-EU synergies in the context of the EU’s Arctic policy is currently 
particularly valuable. First, in the mid-term, the process of formulating the EU’s Arctic policy 
allows for maintaining a certain degree of EU attention towards Arctic issues in the time when 
the EU faces critical challenges in other regions, borderlands and in other policy sectors. 
Second, the relevance of the EU’s Arctic policy from the perspective of European 
northernmost regions is enhanced with the 2016 policy statement, in contrast to the earlier 
dominance of the Circumpolar/pan-Arctic dimension. The affairs of the northernmost 
European regions have entered the core of the domain of the EU’s Arctic policy. While Arctic 
Joint Communication largely lists ongoing EU actions and policies that are already in place, it 
is within Arctic Europe where most of new actions under the EU Arctic policy are to take 
place. 
The term “Arctic Europe” in this study refers to the northernmost regions of Finland, Norway 
and Sweden (known in Nordic countries as the North Calotte). By using the term “Arctic 
Europe” we do not indicate direct linkage to the recent idea of Arctic Europe collaboration 
between several Arctic towns and regional development authorities (see section 2.1.3.).  
The term Arctic Europe has been chosen in order to avoid direct association with the North 
Calotte Council cooperation but also to emphasize that the region constitutes an integral part 
of Europe, suggesting that the EU’s Arctic policy is as much about the Arctic as about the 
socio-economic development and environmental wellbeing of an important part of Europe.  
Moreover, this study suggests that the process – launched by the 2016 Joint Communication 
– to identify investment and research priorities for the European Arctic, could be productively 
used to start building a framework development strategy for Arctic Europe. 
Nordic cooperation forums considered here are primarily the Nordic Council of Ministers and 
Nordic cross-border committees. Actions of other cooperation venues such as the Nordic 
Investment Bank or the Northern Sparsely Populated Areas network and their focus areas 
are also discussed. 
Many Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) thematic documents mention the importance of 
cooperation with the European Commission or the necessity of alignment with EU policies. 
The Finnish 2016 Nordic NCM Presidency highlighted the need to link up Nordic cooperation 
to what is taking place in the EU (Nordic Council of Ministers 2016). Similarly, the Norwegian 
presidency programme focuses on positioning Nordic region in Europe, declaring:  
“A strong Nordic voice in Europe is good for the region and good for 
Europe. The Nordic region needs a strong Europe. Europe needs a 
strong Nordic region. Nordic precedents can provide inspiration on the 
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 European Commission and The High Representative, ‘An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic’, Joint 
Communication, JOIN(2016)21final (27 April 2016). 
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climate and the environment, on energy issues, digitisation and other 
areas of mutual interest” (NCM 2016) 
In turn, the EU’s 2016 Joint Communication, emphasizes that “[t]he Nordic Council and the 
Nordic Council of Ministers are […] relevant partners for the European Union, not least given 
their longstanding engagement with EU and their Arctic cooperation programme.” 
The EU’s Arctic policy can be of relevance for the regional development and cooperation in 
Arctic Europe. There are interconnections between Nordic intergovernmental and cross-
border cooperation and the EU’s Arctic policy. This study looks at four dimensions of these 
interconnections: 
OUTPUTS: the outputs of the 2016 Joint Communication, which are particularly 
relevant for the northern regions of Finland, Norway and Sweden (part 1); 
SYNERGIES: the thematic overlaps between the EU’s Arctic policy and Arctic-
relevant actions and priorities of Nordic cooperation venues (incl. bioeconomy, 
innovation, climate) (part 2); 
STRATEGY AND COOPERATION: ideas to utilize the EU-Arctic Stakeholder 
Forum process to commence the formulation of an overarching strategic framework 
for Arctic Europe, bringing together Nordic cooperation and the EU policies (part 3); 
IMPORTANCE: aspects of prospective developments in Arctic Europe that could be 
of relevance/benefit for the whole EU/EEA (part 4). 
The first part of the study (OUTPUTS) is descriptive and provides background for the ideas 
proposed in parts 2-4. Any analysis of Arctic Europe’s potential and developmental needs 
requires acknowledgment of challenges and problems (reiterated in various studies): 
peripherality and sparse population, accessibility and connectivity, demographic trends, 
dependence on resource extraction, as well as constraints on the emergence of critical mass 
and human capital within the region. Border obstacles and future climate adaptation are seen 
by stakeholders as highly relevant issues in Arctic Europe. These challenges are presented 
in part 1 and juxtaposed with the relevant statements in the 2016 Joint Communication. 
The question of utilizing the Arctic Stakeholder forum process (and associated initiatives: 
network of programme managers and annual stakeholder conferences, part 3) is seen as 
particularly relevant and therefore it has received particular attention (part 3). 
This study builds on: Nordic and EU policy documents, scholarly analyses and existing 
literature and reports, as well as interviews with officials from the Nordic Council of Ministers, 
North Calotte Council, Tornio Valley Council, European Commission’s DG Regional Policy 
(DG REGIO), Brussels offices of northernmost regions, Lapland Regional Council, and 
programme managers (Interreg Northern Periphery and Arctic, Interreg Baltic Sea Region). It 
also draws on the outputs of the NSPA Forum (Mikkeli, 10.06.2016), Arctic Innovation Camp 
(Rovaniemi, 16-19.11.2016), Arctic Futures Symposium (Brussels, 30.11.2016), as well other 
personal communication by the authors. The names of interviewees are not given in 
references. 
The study was produced as a part of a project "Suomen puheenjohtajuus arktisessa 
neuvostossa kasvaneen epävarmuuden aikakaudella" (Finland's Arctic Council chairmanship 
in the times of increasing uncertainty). The project is funded by the Finland's Prime Minister's 
Office (VNK) as part of the Government’s analysis, assessment and research activities (VN-
TEAS). It is implemented jointly by the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland, the Finnish 
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Institute of International Affairs and the Marine Research Centre of the Finnish Environment 
Institute.  
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1. OUTPUTS: THE EU ARCTIC POLICY FOR 
ARCTIC EUROPE 
1.1. OUTPUTS: Key ideas 
1. The European Union’s Arctic policy remains primarily a compilation of ongoing actions and 
of Arctic manifestations of general EU policies. However, the document gives hope for 
maintaining the EU’s long-term interest in the region in times of multiple crises. 
2. Compared to earlier documents, the 2016 Joint Communication has greater emphasis on 
issues specific to the European Arctic. 
3. The EU will never become the main public actor shaping developments in Arctic Europe, 
but can play a role supportive to actions at national and regional level. 
4. Investments in clean technologies, bioeconomy, and renewables are among most 
prospective areas for EU contribution. Extraction of non-renewable resources has received 
very limited attention. 
5. Entrepreneurship and innovation are key themes in EU policies. Facilitating the 
development and testing of technologies that could be exported across Europe and globally 
are suitable areas of EU action, including via research funding. 
6. Investment financing via the EIB funds can become in the mid-term the central mode of EU 
support in the region, particularly for interventions enhancing accessibility and connectivity. 
7. EU programmes have assumed a key role in supporting cross-border cooperation across 
the region.  
8. The main output of the 2016 Joint Communication for Arctic Europe is the EU-Arctic 
Stakeholder Forum process aiming at formulating key investment and research priorities. Part 
3 of this study is dedicated to the ways how this opportunity could be productively utilized. 
1.2. The EU’s role in Arctic Europe 
The EU’s role in the northern regions of Finland, Norway and Sweden is multidimensional. 
The EU is an important regulator, both for the EU regions as well as for Norway as a member 
of the European Economic Area (EEA). The EU is also promoting frameworks such as smart 
specialization and the EU’s Arctic policy, which affect how regional planning is carried out. 
Compared to other part of Europe, EU funding programmes
2
 are relatively small in terms of 
monetary resources. However, they are very important for cross-border cooperation in Arctic 
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 European Structural and Investment Funds programmes include structural funding implemented through national 
programmes (and regional programmes for Sweden), Interreg programmes: cross-border (Interreg Nord), 
transnational (Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme), interregional, and European Neighborhood Instrument 
cross-border programmes (Kolarctic, Karelia). Sources of funding are European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD), European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF) and European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) (Cohesion Fund is not operating in Nordic countries). 
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Europe. The EU has facilitated or is a key player in funding and frameworks for Arctic 
Europe’s cooperation with northwest Russia and North Atlantic partners. 
Since the accession of Finland and Sweden to the EU and the establishment of the EEA, the 
EU funding programmes have become a crucial element of regional cooperation in Arctic 
Europe. Nordic cross-border committees (see section 2.1.2.) facilitate or take part in EU-
funded projects, which serve to mobilize actors to work together and create networks. It 
provides funding for cooperation, which would not be otherwise available (Gaskell 2014; 
Lindqvist 2010; van der Zwet et al. 2014).  
The regions that constitute Arctic Europe are also covered by the EU Strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region (EUSBSR). The EUSBSR is the first of the EU’s macro-regions, which are to 
bring together actors in order to respond to certain transnational challenges. For the Baltic 
Sea Region that includes environmental protection, economic prosperity, accessibility 
(transport), attractiveness and safety and security (Lindqvist 2010).
3
 However, actors in Arctic 
Europe have shown more interest in programmes designed specifically for northernmost 
regions and have focused on cooperation among northern partners rather than on the North-
South axis, which would characterize their engagement in EUSBSR and the Baltic Sea 
Region Programme. 
EU policies and funding serve as an important contribution to nationally and regionally-driven 
developments. However, the EU is not a central public actor that shapes the future of Arctic 
Europe. This role is and will be played by Nordic national governments together with regional 
authorities (in the context of global environmental, economic and social developments). 
Therefore, there needs to be a strong engagement of the Nordic states. Nordic regional 
development policies have to be crafted for the needs of the North. National financial, 
regulatory and political support for key northern projects as well as for local SMEs is critical. 
Nonetheless, national and regional policies have to operate in harmony with EU actions and 
the EU’s regional development priorities. That is also why the EU’s Arctic policy and Nordic 
cooperation venues may strengthen each other’s goals.  
1.3. The scope and limitations of the 2016 Joint 
Communication 
The 2016 Joint Communication “The integrated EU policy for the Arctic”– as its 2008 and 
2012 predecessors – remains a very general document, providing for few concrete and 
tangible outputs. It is mostly composed of actions that are already ongoing or stemming from 
the EU’s sectoral policies (e.g., climate mitigation or the existing framework of cohesion 
programmes). It has limited influence on the sectoral decision-making within the EU, even as 
regards funding for Arctic research or for regional development and transnational or cross-
border cooperation. These actions and policies are anchored in pan-EU decision-making 
processes, which are driven by multiple factors; and Arctic policy dimension is only one of 
many elements within such broader considerations.  
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 While the EUSBSR has an external dimension (linked up to Northern Dimension joint policy and ND partnerships 
as well as to the Council of Baltic Sea States), it is primarily an internal EU policy anchored in the EU’s regional 
policy.  The focus of the EUSBSR work is on the Baltic Sea and southern part of the region. The outputs of the 
EUSBSR have been also so far limited. In principle, macro-regional strategies are not to be associated with new 
regulations, institutions or funding. The goal is rather to better coordinate existing institutions, facilitate 
implementation of existing regulations and use available resources more efficiently. 
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At present, the Arctic and Arctic Europe do not emerge as central priority areas for the EU’s 
interest and intervention. The EU’s neighbourhood to the East and the South is currently 
characterized by a great degree of instability. The EU budget is entering times of intense 
pressures due to Brexit and ongoing implications of refugee crisis, with many net-payers 
demanding cuts in EU expenditure. It is likely that there will be increased pressure on 
facilitating European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI)-style loans and limiting the 
resources available for national structural funding programmes and Interreg funding. That 
would put pressure on traditional funding programmes.  
Despite its aforementioned limitations, the major output of the Arctic policy is that it allows for 
maintaining a certain degree of EU attention towards Arctic issues as the EU struggles with 
critical challenges in other geographical and policy areas. EU policy documents read: “EU 
has a strategic interest in playing a key role in the Arctic region” (2016 Joint Communication), 
and that the EU and its Member States have a ”central role in supporting sustainable 
development and innovation” in the Arctic (Council of the European Union 2016). Such 
statements open possibilities for sustained EU contribution to research relevant for the 
European Arctic, as well as for maintained levels of funding for regional development, cross-
border cooperation, and connectivity. Moreover, owing to the adoption of the 2016 Joint 
Communication, the specific challenges related to the environment, societies and economies 
of Arctic Europe are more likely to be visible in the EU general decision-making processes in 
the coming years. A positive development in this context is that the EEAS and the European 
Commission have launched a project – led by the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland – 
to assess the ways the 2016 Joint Communication is manifested in EU policy-making and 
actions. 
The 2016 Joint Communication puts much greater attention to the internal dimension of the 
EU’s Arctic affairs than the previous EU Arctic policy documents. The word “integrated policy” 
in the Communication title refers to a policy bringing together internal and external aspects.  
The earliest EU documents from 2008 and 2009 had primarily foreign affairs and maritime 
focus, but already from 2010 the affairs of Arctic Europe have gradually become an important 
component of the “Arctic affairs” within the EU. There are a number of elements in the 2016 
Communication that are of particular relevance to Arctic Europe and Nordic cooperation in 
the North. 
1.4. Key Arctic Europe’s challenges and EU Arctic policy 
responses 
Over the last decade, numerous assessments of developments in the Europe’s northernmost 
regions have generally pointed to the same problems and challenges (Dubois and Roto 2012; 
Husebekk et al. 2015; Lapland Chamber of Commerce 2016; NPA 2014; Stepien et al. 
2014).
4
 These include: peripherality and sparse population (together with accessibility and 
connectivity), demographic trends (thinning-out countryside and outflow of young people and 
women), dependence on resource extraction (and need to diversify northern economies), 
challenges arising from changes in traditional industries (forestry, reindeer herding, fisheries). 
Moreover, experts highlight the need to plan for climate adaptations, as well as constrained 
                                                          
 
4
 Also, personal communication with representatives of the Brussels offices of the NSPA regions as well as 
discussions at the Mikkeli NSPA Forum (10 June 2016) and Arctic Innovation Camp (Rovaniemi, 17 November 
2016) as regards the results of 2017 OECD study “Territorial Reviews: Northern Sparsely Populated Areas”. 
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critical mass and human capital (and need to integrate better Arctic Europe to facilitate such 
critical mass). Border obstacles and climate adaptation are also relevant issues in the region. 
Many elements of the 2016 Joint Communication – including those referring to the 
Circumpolar Arctic – are of relevance to the northernmost regions of Finland, Norway and 
Sweden. The Joint Communication states clearly that “the EU can play an influential role in 
shaping the future development of the European part of the Arctic” via its legislation 
applicable to the European Economic Area and deployment of financial instruments. 
1.4.1. Remoteness and sparse population 
Remoteness and sparse population are seen as key permanent developmental 
disadvantages in Arctic Europe. They affect transport costs (for people and goods) and 
accessibility to markets (especially within the EU’s single market). They also entail difficulties 
in generating critical mass needed for successful business ventures or innovation. The 
challenges can be exacerbated by the existence of border obstacles. Remoteness and 
sparsity can be also an asset: for tourism industry, for traditional livelihoods requiring 
extensive land areas (especially reindeer herding) and for lifestyles alternative to modern 
urban life. Investments in accessibility and connectivity have been proposed as the main 
measures to address region’s permanent disadvantages. These include transport links (road, 
rail and air) to the Nordic and EU socio-economic centres, as well as intra-regional, East-
West connections. Broadband connectivity is currently in focus, as it is crucial for more 
efficient business processes, improving labour productivity, e-commerce, access to wide 
range of materials for education, e-government, telemedicine as well as social and 
community participation. To some extent, broadband allows to overcome remoteness of 
Arctic communities. While Arctic Europe is well-connected when compared to other Arctic 
regions, more investment is needed (Arctic Economic Council 2016). 
EU Arctic policy actions:  
While no commitments are made in the 2016 Joint Communication, the EU appears to be 
willing to support strengthening north-south connections via trans-European networks, 
including Finland’s connections to Arctic Ocean. Possibly, this could be supported by the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) loans and European Structural and Investment Funds 
(ESIF). Financing for land, sea and air transport connections as well as telecommunications 
is mentioned in the Joint Communication. In the region, projects dedicated to railway
5
 and a 
transcontinental broadband data cable (Lipponen and Svento 2016) are currently discussed. 
Within Arctic Europe, the Joint Communication highlights the role of cross-border sections 
and bottlenecks within the Trans-European Network for Transport (TEN-T). Sustainable 
transport modes are to be promoted.  
Role of TEN-T ports (Kemi, Oulu, Luleå, Narvik and Hammerfest) is mentioned as important 
for opening access to the region. Maritime transport in the North is to be supported by 
enhancing monitoring for safety and communication. In the past, the EU has co-financed a 
number of northern infrastructure feasibility studies. The Joint Communication acknowlledges 
the existence of innovative companies in the North (ICT, data processing, industrial design, 
circular economy), which require effective access to the Single Market for growth. Digital 
Single Market is named as one of the means to achieve that goal.  
                                                          
 
5
 See Arctic Corridor website – promoting the railway connection – at http://www.arcticcorridor.fi/  
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In general, most EU programmes (national, Interreg cross-border and transnational) 
operating in the North address the specific challenges related to remoteness, sparsity and 
problems typical for rural areas. Conditions of remoteness and sparsity as well as climate 
constitute justification for special state aid rules applicable in northernmost regions. This 
advantage can be used in terms of national support for SMEs and innovation funding.
6
 
1.4.2. Demographic challenges and human capital 
Sparsity is coupled with demographic challenges: population loss in some regions, 
thinning-out rural areas across Arctic Europe, aging society, as well as out-migration of 
women and young people. These yield difficulties for the delivery of public services. Lack of 
human capital or mismatch between skills and labour market needs are noticeable across the 
region, although some areas (particularly in Norway) or localities (Kiruna and Luleå in 
Sweden) experience influx of professionals due to growth in mining, blue economy, ICT, and 
data centres sectors. At the same time, many Arctic Europe towns are growing, developing 
into vibrant, socio-economically diverse communities.  
EU Arctic policy actions:  
The EU Arctic policy does not address directly the question of demographic challenges. 
However, support for research at universities and institutes located in Arctic Europe and 
contribution to development of SMEs’ capacities may result in building up of human capital. 
EU programmes can support building human capital by strong involvement of private sector 
in projects. So far, the main participants in EU projects have been public bodies and 
academia, but there has been increasing focus on private sector involvement with each 
consecutive programming period since the mid-1990s.  
1.4.3. Dependence on extractive industries 
Arctic Europe remains disproportionally dependent on the extraction of renewable and non-
renewable resources, including hydrocarbons and fisheries in Norway, raw materials and 
forestry in Sweden and Finland. Structural changes in many of these industries are among 
reasons for demographic challenges mentioned earlier. All regional development strategies 
aim at tackling this dependence by investing in diversification of local economies as well as 
bringing the refining of resources extracted in Arctic Europe into the region.  
EU Arctic policy actions:  
The authors of the 2016 Joint Communication generally avoid discussing issues related to 
extractive industries. However, the European Commission and High Representative in their 
2016 Joint Communication support the development of “Arctic standards”. As regards oil and 
gas activities, the EU is willing to promote its regulatory and technological best practice. 
Notwithstanding, its 2013 Offshore Safety Directive (2013/30/EU) had been criticized and 
rejected by Norway as being EEA applicable.  
By proposing investments in innovative technologies and SMEs, the EU may support the 
diversification of regional economies. This is to be done primarily through the EIB financing 
projects in low-carbon technologies or energy efficiency. The possibilities to use state aid for 
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 Personal communication, officials from Brussels offices of northern regions (North Norway, North Sweden, North 
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boosting activities of the SMEs operating in the EU/EEA’s sparsely populated areas could be 
better utilized by the Nordic states. 
1.4.4. Traditional livelihoods and indigenous rights 
Traditional livelihoods and indigenous cultures – in particular those of the Sámi, the only EU’s 
Arctic indigenous people – were under pressure of settler societies and assimilation policies 
in the past and are currently still facing socio-economic changes as well as conflicts 
regarding access to lands and resources. At present, the question of language education, 
access to pastures for reindeer herders, land rights, marine and freshwater fishing rights, as 
well as the struggle for greater influence on decision-making are among main challenges. 
The Sámi often highlight that there should be a place in the European Arctic for livelihoods 
such as reindeer herding or traditional fisheries. Traditional livelihoods may generate less 
monetary output than resource extraction or modern industry, but are endowed with other 
type of values in cultural, wellbeing, nature and identity terms. 
EU Arctic policy actions:  
The EU will maintain the annual dialogue format with Arctic indigenous peoples. There is a 
pledge “to work on advancing consistency between the EU’s internal and external policy 
towards indigenous peoples”. That is important, as while the EU has extensive guidelines on 
the indigenous peoples in development cooperation and international interactions,
7
 there are 
few documents addressing specifically the Sámi issues within the EU regulatory framework.  
The 2016 Joint Communication highlights that many EU ESIF programmes including 
territorial cooperation programmes and European Neighborhood Instrument Programmes 
provide various forms of support for livelihoods and cultures. The 2014-2020 Interreg 
Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme focuses on using innovation towards robust 
communities, promoting entrepreneurship and developing cultural and natural heritage. 
Interreg North, Northern Periphery, and from 2014 Northern Periphery and Arctic 
programmes have provided funding for a number of initiatives relevant for Sámi culture and 
livelihoods (including via supporting indigenous entrepreneurship). 
1.4.5. Climate change and adaptation 
Need for climate change adaptation is not yet a key issue in Arctic Europe, despite the region 
being the fastest warming part of Europe. Current challenges include impacts on winter 
tourism, increased risk of flooding, and certain – so far limited – impacts on infrastructure 
(Stępień et al. 2016). However, the future projections for the Arctic climate change and 
expectations for exacerbation of impacts have encouraged regional actors to consider how to 
adapt to the change. 
EU Arctic policy actions:  
The EU contributes to climate adaptation in Arctic Europe via its support for knowledge-
building on climate change and the Union’s input into climate and weather monitoring 
programmes, including satellite-based and pan-Arctic observing initiatives (e.g. SAON, EU 
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 E.g., European Commission and High Representative (2016). Implementing EU External Policy on Indigenous 
Peoples, Joint Staff Working Document, Brussels, 17.10.2016, SWD(2016) 340 final. 
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contributed most notably via InterAct). Significant number of Sustaining Arctic Observing 
Networks (SAON) stations are located in Arctic Europe.  
It is proposed that European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) could support 
adaptation and mitigation initiatives. The EU has an Adaptation Strategy, and in the past, EU 
funds provided resources for the work on regional climate change strategies. The main EU 
contribution remains, since the first Arctic policy statement in 2008, its international and pan-
European climate change mitigation policies, including especially UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Paris Agreement, and the EU’s energy and climate 
policy. Potentially important action is the EU’s Air Quality Package (there is an ongoing 
discussion on the proposed directive) and the EU’s work in international forums (Convention 
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Stockholm Convention on POPs, Climate and 
Clean Air Coalition, as well as the UNFCCC), including those dedicated to short-lived climate 
forcers (SLCFs). The emissions of SLCFs generated in Europe affect to great extent Arctic 
Europe (Stępień et al. 2016).  
1.4.6. Border obstacles 
While the Arctic Europe is located within the framework of Nordic labour market and the 
EU/EEA, the workers and companies operating in the region continue to experience various 
border obstacles. For sparsely-populated areas, these obstacles hinder: the match between 
human capital and labour market needs, the provision of services across borders, and the 
creation of Arctic Europe-wide business projects. The 2015 report “Growth from the North” 
(Husebekk et al. 2015) in its vision for turning Arctic Europe into economically vibrant region 
and one of drivers of Nordic economies, called for harmonization of relevant regulations, 
more effective integration of labour market and one strategic plan for infrastructure and 
transport. In terms of regulations, the tackling of border obstacles is seen as a key challenge. 
In recent years, much has been done at the Freedom of Movement Council, which attempts 
to deal with several obstacles annually.
8
 However, certain issues remain problematic, 
especially as regards taxation and access to social services for (cross-) border workers 
(persons who permanently live on one side of border and work on the other).
9
 Another 
ongoing challenge are construction regulations, especially in Norway. 
EU Arctic policy actions:  
While the Arctic policy does not address the issue of border obstacles, tackling them is often 
seen as one of the preconditions for enhancing opportunities for entrepreneurship and 
innovation in the North and better integration of the region with the single market (goals of the 
EU’s Arctic policy). The 2016 Joint Communication also states that the EIB can invest in 
cross-border projects between Finland, Sweden and Norway if these have “significant 
development potential”. Eliminating border obstacles would increase development potential of 
such projects.  
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 For instance, progress has been achieved with changing the procedures for taxation (VAT) for equipment 
transported temporarily across borders in order to provide a service. 
9
 Personal communication with North Calotte Border Information Desk expert, Rovaniemi, 5.10.2016. 
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The European Commission’s DG REGIO has prepared an inventory of border obstacles in 
the EU/EEA including examples of how they are tackled in different parts of Europe (Cross-
Border Review).
10
 
1.4.7. New economic opportunities 
While the abovementioned challenges are present, there are also new opportunities (see, 
Stepien 2016). The Arctic regions can be places for innovative bioeconomy developments, 
including biofuels, blue economy, as well as Arctic bio-based organic products (e.g. Arctic 
foods and cosmetics). There is still a great renewable energy potential, with wind power on 
the rise. These could contribute to mitigation policies in Europe. In the last years, the region 
has seen increase in investments in data centres, testing facilities and tourism. There are 
also hopes that economic development in the Circumpolar Arctic could create markets for 
Nordic cold climate technologies, e-services, or bring more clients to region’s testing facilities.  
EU Arctic policy actions: The 2016 Joint Communication focuses on using the EU’s 
cohesion policy and cross-border cooperation to support investments in innovation, SMEs’ 
competitiveness, and the shift towards low-carbon economy. ESIF programmes as well as 
Horizon 2020 are to promote development and deployment of innovative technologies, 
including translation of research findings into viable cold climate technologies and services, 
as well as supporting entry of such technologies to the European market.  
The 2016 Joint Communication acknowledges that Arctic Europe suffers from 
underinvestment. The European Commission declares that it will “help to monitor potential 
opportunities for sustainable economic activities” with blue economy being mentioned in 
particular. The Communication also emphasizes the potential for growth as regards 
renewable energy. The European Investment Advisory Hub and Project Portal could help in 
attracting non-public financing, with proposal for developing dedicated platforms “to bring 
together different investors in the Arctic region”. Development of blue economy and 
improvement of marine productivity is to be supported by the European Marine Observation 
and Data Network (EMODnet), making a broad range of already collected data readily 
available. 
Various EU programmes operating in the North are to be better coordinated and thus more 
effective (chapter 3 of this study is dedicated to this question). 
1.4.8. International tensions 
Arctic Europe borders northwest Russia and in the period after the end of Cold War a 
network of connections had been established, including people-to-people cooperation, 
business linkages, and political contacts. The region has become one of the premier areas 
for cooperation between the EU and Russia. Since 2014, these achievements are under 
pressure from international tensions originating from outside the region. 
EU Arctic policy actions:  
The 2016 Joint Communication commits to “support[ing] regional and sub-regional 
cooperation”. Venues of cooperation where Russia is a key partner (Barents Euro-Arctic 
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 See European Commission DG REGIO website at 
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Council and Northern Dimension) are particularly highlighted. Cooperation with Russia in the 
Arctic is to be maintained (clearly, in the spirit of so-called “selective engagement”). 
Furthermore, Arctic issues are to continue to be “an important element of the EU’s close 
relations” with Norway.  
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2. SYNERGIES: COMMON THEMES OF NORDIC 
COOPERATION AND THE EU’S ARCTIC POLICY 
2.1. SYNERGIES: Key ideas  
1. The Nordic Council of Ministers and Nordic cross-border committees operating in Arctic 
Europe could enhance cooperation on issues such as climate change, transport and 
innovation. 
2. Nordic cooperation venues could facilitate networks and projects on circular economy 
solutions suitable for peripheral, sparsely populated regions. These include small-scale 
circular solutions for Arctic communities as well as Arctic Europe-wide systems for material 
and waste flows spanning across Arctic Europe. Building on these networks, projects for EU 
funding programmes including Interreg and Horizon 2020 (or its successors) could be 
developed. 
3. Currently, Nordic bioeconomy strategy is being prepared and the EU Bioeconomy Strategy 
is to be reviewed. Both bioeconomy strategies should have a clear Arctic dimension, 
considering Arctic-specific challenges and climate change implications. A degree of EU-
Nordic cooperation in drafting these strategies would be an advantage. 
4. EU funding can be used more effectively to support scaling up of Nordic low-carbon and 
green economy solutions relevant for the Arctic. Deploying low-carbon technologies is 
particularly challenging in remote Arctic communities and therefore national, EU and Nordic 
support is needed to develop feasible low-carbon options. Arctic regions could also serve as 
living labs for implementation of new technologies and ideas.  
5. Nordic cooperation venues and the EU could work more closely on supporting e-services 
and e-health development. The possibilities for deploying these solutions across the 
circumpolar North and across Europe – especially in rural areas – could be jointly explored 
and financially supported. 
6. Joint branding of Nordic Arctic products and services could be strengthened, supported by 
both Nordic cooperation venues and the EU. For the EU, this would be a way to contribute to 
competitiveness of the northernmost regions. For the Nordic cooperation, it would be a 
possibility to enhance the common Arctic Europe market as regards labour mobility, service 
delivery and regulatory framework, as advocated by the “Growth from the North” report 
(Husebekk et al. 2015). Arctic Europe branding could benefit Arctic foods exports, common 
tourism offers and aggregated innovation potential. 
7. The European Investment Bank could follow the example of the Nordic Investment Bank 
and dedicate pull of resources for financing of Arctic-specific projects. Actors from across 
Europe could be involved in these investments. Possibilities for joint financing of key Arctic 
projects by the Nordic and EU financing institutions could be considered. 
8. If the Nordic Sámi Convention is ratified by the three Nordic countries and it enters into 
force, the EU should continue strong support for Sámi projects facilitating cooperation across 
borders. Nordic cooperation could focus on cultural and identity aspects, while the EU 
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funding – as is currently the case – would enhance pan-Sámi entrepreneurship, business 
networking and climate change adaptation covering whole Sápmi. 
9. The current work on the new NCM Arctic Cooperation Programme for 2018-2021 and the 
identification of key investment and research priorities in the Arctic Stakeholder Forum 
(launched by the 2016 Joint Communication) could be brought closer. This is relevant 
especially for areas where a broader set of prospective Arctic economic activities could be 
supported, going beyond large-scale resource extraction. 
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2.2. Arctic-relevant themes in the venues of Nordic 
cooperation 
There are multiple cooperation frameworks present in Arctic Europe, including North Calotte 
Council, Bothnian Arc, Tornio Valley Council,
11
 the Northern Sparsely Populated Area 
network, and new initiatives such as the Arctic Europe cooperation. The most important 
venue for collaboration remains, however, the Nordic Council of Ministers. All forums of 
Nordic cooperation in Arctic Europe deal with themes, where there are commonalities with 
the EU’s Arctic policy. 
2.2.1. Nordic Council of Ministers 
The Nordic Council of Ministers is the primary venue for Nordic cooperation at state level. 
The most recent key themes of work under the NCM include in particular: 
 bioeconomy; 
 Nordic climate solutions; 
 education and research in the Nordic region; 
 Nordic food and nutrition; 
 energy cooperation. 
Bioeconomy is believed to have potential to enhance competitiveness and sustainability of 
Nordic economies; thus, it is not a new topic in Nordic cooperation. In the 2012 Nidaros 
Declaration, Ministers for Fisheries and Aquaculture, Agriculture, Food and Forestry 
underlined the key role of primary production and food industries in green growth (already 
then, the Ministers called for better coordination of bioeconomy work with the European 
Commission). Bioeconomy was one of the priorities of the Icelandic Presidency in 2014 and 
Finnish Presidency in 2016.
12
 Under the Arctic bioeconomy theme, among the topics for 
cooperation were tourism/recreation, blue economy, forest policy, and Arctic food. Nordic 
region is to be shown as a showcase of successful bioeconomy development, with joint 
Nordic strategy being currently drafted by the Nordic Bioeconomy Panel. 
The NCM work on the Nordic food goes back at least to 2004 with “New Nordic Food” 
programme. It includes promotion of Nordic food industry, problems of nutrition and limiting of 
food waste.  
Nordic Council of Ministers promotes Nordic green growth solutions, including climate 
solutions. In green growth framework, the Nordic energy market is expected to play a role of 
a living laboratory for climate-smart low-carbon energy solutions.
13
 
Nordic Arctic Cooperation Programme (ACP) is managed by Nordregio: Nordic Centre for 
Regional Development.
14
 Objective of the programme is to “support processes, projects and 
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a horizontal action “Sustainable Development and Bioeconomy” under the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. 
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initiatives that will help promote sustainable development and benefit the people of the Arctic 
under the conditions generated by globalisation and climate change”.
15
 The Programme is 
co-ordinating the NCM’s Arctic activities. Relatively small funds are distributed (DKK 10 mln 
annually, EUR 1.350.000) within broad priority themes. For 2015-2017, the ACP has four 
themes (generally constituting continuation of priorities from previous funding periods):  
 people (solutions to challenges relating to demographics, settlement patterns, town 
planning and transport, building cultural and social capital, with emphasis on gender 
and indigenous dimensions);  
 sustainable economic development (new circumpolar business opportunities and 
address challenges related to increased economic activity and a more diverse 
economy, promoting sustainable use of natural resources, innovation and green 
growth, e.g. in shipping, maritime safety, fisheries, tourism and renewable energy);  
 environment, nature and climate (counteract environmental changes caused by 
human activity, preserve natural environment and biodiversity, support climate 
adaptation); 
 education and skills enhancement (improving learning networks, building capacity in 
governance, developing local ICT competences).
16
 
The NCM has had a long tradition of good cooperation with Russia and Russian actors. 
However, the closure of NCM offices in St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad (and Barents region 
outposts in Murmansk or Archangelsk) – due to labelling these offices as a “foreign agent” – 
has adversely impacted the NCM’s efforts. 
The 2016 Finland’s Presidency in the Nordic Council of Ministers focused on cooperation 
on water matters, bioeconomy, as well as the changing welfare state (Nordic Council of 
Ministers 2016). Bioeconomy and circular economy themes encompassed nature tourism, 
fisheries, forestry, waste management and ecosystem-based approach. Digitization, 
creativity, innovation and matching skills with labour market needs were emphasized, all of 
importance in Nordic northernmost regions. Importantly, Finland’s NCM Presidency 
programme highlighted challenges present in sparsely populated areas: connectivity 
(transport, broadband but also development and learning networks), economic diversification, 
as well as local solutions for services-provision and digitization of government functions. 
Seeking solutions to special issues affecting rural areas were part of the Presidency’s 
programme. 
The Norwegian 2017 NCM Presidency continues the main themes of the previous years, 
including climate issues, global transition to green economy, the focus on education, 
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 See Nordic Arctic cooperation Programme brochure at 
http://www.nordregio.se/Global/About%20Nordregio/Arktiskt%20samarbetsprogram/2015-2017/Arctic%20Co-
operation%20Programme%202015-2017%20ENG.pdf  
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 Nordic Arctic Programme website (at Nordregio) at http://www.nordregio.se/arcticprogramme  
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 Projects funded by the ACP include: Arctic women conference, Prevention of suicide in Sápmi, Joint Sámi and 
Inuit Youth Capacity Building Project, Environment, Climate and Nature in the Arctic. Education in and from a Nordic 
perspective, Climate Change Teaching in Greenland, Sustainable communities and the Legacy of Mining in the 
Nordic Arctic, Healthy Food and Lifestyle Choices, The 2015 Arctic Energy Summit: Energy in a Lasting Frontier, 
Waste water treatment in Nordic Arctic Areas, Facilitating use of Nordic plant genetic resources, Marine Resource 
Governance in the Arctic. 
The NCM often supports projects of the Arctic Council and its working groups, including: Arctic Human Development 
Report II,  ECONOR III – The Economy of the North report (SDWG), AACA – Adaptation Actions for a Changing 
Arctic, Arctic Shipping Data Service – Development of a circumpolar Arctic shipping database (PAME), Arctic Marine 
Protected and Important Areas: Phase 1: harmonisation and integration of information (PAME/CAFF), State of the 
Arctic Freshwater biodiversity report (CAFF). 
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research and innovation. The focus on health and demographic challenges is highly Arctic-
relevant (NCM 2016). 
Nordic Council of Ministers facilitates work on the elimination of border obstacles. There is 
currently political prioritization of tackling Nordic border obstacles at the NCM level, as the 
Freedom of Movement Council aims at abolishing 5-10 border obstacles annually.
17
 
Promotion of freedom of movement between Nordic countries has been at the core of Nordic 
cooperation since its inception. Finnish 2016 Presidency advocated preventive measures: 
analysis of new, prepared legislation from the point of view of possible new, often 
unforeseen, border obstacles. This could be partly done also as regards new EU regulations 
(Nordic Council of Ministers 2016). 
2.2.2. Nordic cross-border committees  
The Nordic Council of Ministers supports 11 cross-border committees, including those central 
to regional cooperation in Arctic Europe. This work is overseen by the Nordic Committee of 
Senior Officials for Regional Policy, with NCM providing partial funding for operation of cross-
border committees and serving as a forum for the committees to interact and cooperate.  
North Calotte Council is one of the oldest Nordic cross-border cooperation frameworks, 
established in 1967. It brings together representatives from regional authorities and 
organization responsible for regional development. Managed from the secretariat based for 
over a decade at the Lapland Regional Council, it primarily focuses on distributing NCM 
funding via projects to local stakeholders (including co-financing of EU-funded projects). 
Various working groups operate within the Council, including the North Calotte Environmental 
Council. Questions of identity and culture are important elements of the Council’s work. 
Bothnian Arc is an economic association bringing together Finnish and Swedish 
municipalities from around the northern Gulf of Bothnia. Currently, Bothnian Arc implements 
projects on youth unemployment and Arctic food, and earlier it was engaged in projects on 
regional cooperation supporting innovation, energy efficiency projects, regional business 
linkages, or green logistics.
18
 This work clearly reflects EU priorities for Arctic Europe. 
Tornio Valley Council is a cooperation between Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish 
municipalities of the Tornio Valley. The aim is to jointly promote interests of the municipalities, 
cooperation on branding and marketing Tornio valley, developing business sector and labour 
market, promoting education and skills development, developing infrastructure and linkages, 
as well as developing culture of the region. The Council takes part in various EU-funded 
projects. 
Other cross-border committees and cooperation forums are relevant as these regions are 
located close to the Arctic, sharing many challenges and being natural partners contributing 
to the critical mass in private sector, research and project applications. These include 
Kvarken Council, MidtSkandia cooperation, and Nordic Atlantic Cooperation (NORA). 
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2.2.3. Other Nordic cooperation and financing/funding frameworks 
Currently, there is a discussion on establishing a new northern cooperation framework – 
Arctic Europe. It is driven primarily by the cities of Oulu, Rovaniemi, Luleå and Tromsø, with 
the participation of regions/counties and “innovation and research actors”. The cooperation is 
supposed to contribute to northernmost Europe becoming a “forerunner in the global 
competition of skills, business, investments, innovation and growth”. Such a goal would much 
the objectives of the EU’s Arctic policy. There are plans to carry out joint lobbying at the EU 
and national level. 
The Arctic Europe cooperation is underpinned by the recently established Joint Arctic 
Agenda between universities from Oulu, Rovaniemi, Luleå and Tromsø. Joint education 
and research programmes are envisaged. The universities plan to support and complement 
each other in the areas of common interests, including e-health and telemedicine, social 
work, care services, renewable energy, as well as extractive industries operating within 
highest environmental standards. The focus on cooperation is to enhance business-
academia linkages across the region. Exchange of information on best practices in that 
regard is supposed to be an important area of collaboration.
19
 
The Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) is an international financial institution owned by eight 
countries: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden. While 
NIB provides loans both within and outside its member countries, significant part of its lending 
operations is dedicated to implementing owner countries’ priorities. In 2015, a EUR 500 mln 
lending facility has been created in order to finance investments that support Arctic strategies 
of Nordic countries, focusing on energy, transport and SMEs. Attention is given to the 
sustainability and environmental performance of financed projects. The NIB also takes part in 
two Northern Dimension partnerships (environmental; transport and logistics). 
The Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO) has been also engaged in various 
Arctic-relevant projects. In November 2016, NEFCO has facilitated a new co-operation 
programme aimed at improving the state of the environment and addressing climate change 
in northwest Russia.
20
 NEFCO manages Arctic Council’s Project Support Instrument. 
The Northern Sparsely Populated Areas network (NSPAs) groups 14 northernmost 
Finnish (North and East Finland), Swedish and Norwegian regions, and is led by the Brussels 
regional representative offices (North and East Finland, North Sweden, Mid-Sweden, North 
Norway). The primary goal of the network is joint advocacy at the EU level. The NSPAs 
network has taken a strong role as regards the development of the EU’s Arctic policy. The 
networ is now likely to lead the efforts under the EU-Arctic Stakeholder Forum. One of the 
main elements of the NSPAs’ advocacy work at the EU level is to highlight a significant 
potential of Europe’s northernmost regions as places of growth and innovation that could 
benefit whole Europe. At the same time, the NSPAs argue that this potential can be realized 
only when permanent disadvantages of sparsity and remoteness are mitigated.
21
 The 2016 
Joint Communication to some extent endorses this way of thinking about Arctic Europe. 
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EU funding programmes such as Interreg Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme, ENI 
Kolarctic or Interreg North have become crucial for cooperation between Nordic regions, 
Nordic academia, social actors and private sector. A good example is a current Interreg North 
project “Visit Arctic Europe”, led by the Finnish Lapland Tourism Board, aiming at establishing 
northernmost European regions as a single top-class tourism area, with coherent transport 
networks, joint offers, branding and marketing.
22
 
However, EU programmes (other than structural funds for northern Finland and Sweden 
within national and regional operational programmes
23
) provide very limited resources and 
are largely used for networking, exchange of experience, and small innovations. These are 
crucial contributions, but funding for directing and driving regional development in Arctic 
Europe has to come primarily from national and regional sources. 
The landscape of cooperation in the European North is complemented by the collaboration in 
Barents Euro-Arctic Region, where the regional level (Barents Regional Council) includes 
Arctic Europe regions, as well as circumpolar Arctic cooperation (Arctic Council and other 
cooperation frameworks established by Arctic states). At the circumpolar level, many Arctic 
Europe private sector actors are members of the Arctic Economic Council, while some 
regions are members of the recently revitalized Northern Forum (with secretariat currently 
based in Yakutia, Russia). 
2.2.4. Facilitating pan-Sámi cooperation 
From its inception, the Nordic cooperation has been a vehicle supporting the trans-border 
cooperation of the Sámi as one people living in three Nordic states.
24
 While the pan-Sámi 
cooperation goes back to the Trondheim meeting in 1917, the organization of regular Sámi 
Conferences and the establishment of the Sámi Council in the 1950s was greatly facilitated 
by the emergence of the Nordic cooperation and the creation of the Nordic Council. Building 
on that foundation, numerous pan-Sámi trans-border organizations emerged through the 
1960s to 1990s, organizing Sámi youth, teachers, artists and other professions. In the 1990s, 
Sámi Parliamentary cooperation was added to the picture (Stepien 2012; Stepien et al. 
2015). One area where the Nordic cooperation fell short of Sámi expectations is lack of 
formal membership of the Sámi institutions in the Nordic Council or the Nordic Council of 
Ministers, although Sámi representatives take part in many meetings of relevance to Sámi 
interests.  
Recently, the most important process in terms of trans-border questions is the drafting of and 
negotiations on the Nordic Sámi Convention (NSC). The idea for the NSC was developed 
under the Nordic Council and the NSC draft was prepared by a committee, consisting of three 
members appointed by Finland, Sweden and Norway and three by the respective Sámi 
parliaments. The draft was submitted by the committee to the Nordic governments and the 
Sámi Parliaments in October 2005 (Koivurova 2008). Inter-state negotiations were 
commenced in 2011 and now, at the beginning of 2017 (before the centenary celebrations of 
the historic pan-Sámi meeting in Trondheim, on 6 February 2017) the agreement has been 
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reached in the negotiation, meaning that now the respective states will start preparing the 
ratification of the Convention.
25
  
In the preamble of the current version of the text (22.11.2016), it is made clear that one of the 
fundamental ideas for the proposed convention is that the Sámi are one indivisible people, 
even though spread across many states’ territories. As stated by the governments in the 
preamble: “the Sámi as people and indigenous people in the three states has its own culture, 
its own society and its own language, which stretches over the national borders” (unofficial 
translation). The states also affirm the customary rights of the Sámi and their cross-border 
co-operation rights via the so-called Lapp Codicil from 1751 (an annex to a border treaty 
between Sweden and Norway).  
Of much importance for this report is that the objective of the proposed Convention is to 
affirm and strengthen such rights of the Sámi people that are necessary to secure and 
develop its culture, its language and its and society, with the smallest possible interference of 
the national borders. This general objective is made more specific in various articles e.g. in 
Article 10 (co-operation across borders). The three Nordic states are to enhance co-operation 
to remove obstacles for the Sámi that are based on their citizenship or residence or that 
otherwise are a result of the Sámi settlement area stretching across national borders. The 
states are required to render it easier for the Sámi to preserve, use and develop their culture, 
language and societal life across state borders and for them to engage in cross-border 
commercial activities. The states are also obliged to develop opportunities for the Sámi to 
receive education, health, hospital services and social services in another country if this 
proves more appropriate. 
2.2.5. Key areas of Nordic cooperation 
While the overview of the cooperation forums in Arctic Europe may suggest excessive 
complexity and density, each frameworks has its own goals, membership, identity, and 
niches. These frameworks constantly interact and intertwine. Commonly, representatives 
attend meetings of other forums/councils and there is significant cooperation in terms of 
obtaining or topping-up funding from EU funds (e.g. between Bothnian Arc and Tornio Valley 
Council). 
The overview of the activities of Nordic cooperation frameworks in Arctic Europe suggests 
focus on the following themes: 
 eliminating border obstacles; 
 bioeconomy (including blue economy); 
 green growth, climate change and energy transition; 
 interlinking regional businesses and creating critical mass in sparsely populated 
areas; 
 supporting culture across borders; 
 supporting Sámi as one people in three/four countries. 
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Many of these aspects are also among key themes of the smart specialization strategies 
adopted by the northernmost EU regions. For instance, Lapland focuses, among others, on: 
green mining, circular economy and industrial symbiosis, refining in the North, bioeconomy 
and local high-value food production, safety of Arctic activities, as well as cold climate 
technologies. These developments are to be supported by encouraging local 
entrepreneurship and innovation, key themes of the EU’s 2020 agenda (Regional Council of 
Lapland 2013a). 
In the NCM, the Arctic remains to be treated as a distinct topic for cooperation. It could be, 
however, more beneficial to integrate Arctic matters into the work within sectoral themes, to 
mainstream it across the institution.
26
 That is already partly the case for Nordic bioeconomy 
work. 
2.3. Thematic synergies between the EU Arctic Policy and 
Nordic cooperation 
As shown above, many themes under purview of the NCM, North Calotte Council, Bothnian 
Arc, the NIB and other Nordic cooperation venues reverberate also in the 2016 Joint 
Communication on the EU’s policy for the Arctic. Productive synergies between Nordic 
cooperation and the EU Arctic Policy should be therefore considered. In this section, we 
highlight key areas for such synergies.   
The programme of the Norwegian NCM Presidency emphasizes the importance of the 
EU/EEA internal market for the Nordic region and highlights that “[t]he Nordic region must 
continue to be one of the most integrated and competitive economies in Europe, with a high 
degree of mobility and co-operation between the countries” (NCM 2016). Norwegian 
Presidency programme lists climate, environment, energy issues and digitization as areas of 
mutual interest. Areas where EU Arctic Policy-Nordic synergies can be found are: 
bioeconomy and circular economy, climate and environment, digitization, border obstacles, 
and supporting trans-border Sámi cooperation. 
The NCM currently works on the new Arctic Cooperation Programme for 2018-2021, which 
provides an opening to find synergies and complementarities with the Arctic-relevant actions 
at the EU level.  
2.3.1. Arctic bioeconomy and circular economy 
Bioeconomy has emerged as one of the key policy areas for Nordic cooperation, with the 
Nordic bioeconomy strategy under preparation. Nordic countries share similar traditions of 
nature-based economies and have strong competence in biotechnology. There is also a 
degree of complementariness among Nordic countries, with dynamic blue economy 
development in Norway and focus on forestry and Arctic foods in Finland and Sweden. 
Notwithstanding, each countries is interested in all bioeconomy sectors. 
Circular economy and bioeconomy are priority areas for the EU, as they are to contribute to 
green growth and transition to environmentally sustainable development. In the 2016 Joint 
Communication, the European Commission and High Representative declare that the EU will 
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“help to monitor potential opportunities for sustainable economic activities” with blue economy 
sectors such as aquaculture, fisheries, offshore renewable energy, maritime tourism and 
maritime biotechnology listed as relevant in this context. Blue economy focus interplays well 
with the Finnish and Norwegian NCM Presidency programmes, where the themes of water 
and blue bioeconomy are highlighted. 
Networks of regions and companies dedicated to both small-scale circular solutions and large 
inter-regional cooperation on material and waste flows should be encouraged. Nordic 
cooperation venues – both NCM and cross-border committees – could facilitate 
establishment of Nordic networks dedicated to Arctic bioeconomy and Arctic circular 
economy. For example, in 2008-2010, EU and Nordic projects considered waste flows across 
the North Calotte region.
27
 Building on these networks, projects for EU programmes including 
Interreg and Horizon 2020 (or its successors) could be developed. 
It may be advantageous to conduct Nordic lobbying at the EU level to support circular 
solutions specifically designed for sparsely populated and peripheral regions. There may be 
potential for exporting these innovative solutions outside of the Nordic region. 
2.3.2. Climate and environment 
A clear area for Nordic-EU synergies is climate change mitigation and adaptation. It is a 
cross-cutting issue across EU, Nordic and national strategies and a core priority area of the 
2016 Joint Communication.  
The Nordic Council of Ministers is focusing on Nordic climate solutions, especially energy 
efficiency and green growth.
28
 One of the goals is scaling-up Nordic low-carbon solutions, 
which include: combined heat and power production technologies, energy efficiency in 
buildings, and cutting nitrous-oxide emissions in manure management in the agricultural 
sector. Arctic regions could serve as testbeds for deployment of some new technologies. The 
testing could be supported by Nordic cooperation venues as well as EU funding and 
regulatory frameworks. Projects disseminating successful technologies across Europe would 
contribute to the EU’s climate and energy goals. 
The EU would like to contribute to developing an “ambitious climate adaptation agenda for 
the Arctic region” (2016 Joint Communication). Future cooperation as regards adaptive 
actions between the EU, national decision-makers, Arctic Europe regions, cross-border 
committees and the NCM should be considered. 
2.3.3. Digitization 
Utilizing digital revolution towards economic and human development is one of the key social 
challenges of our age. However, while still digitization leaders, Nordic countries appear to be 
gradually losing their initial edge over other parts of Europe and the world in terms of e-
economy and the pace of progress in digital transformation (Alm et al. 2016). Challenges 
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specific to sparsely populated northern areas should be considered as an important element 
in a Nordic renewed commitment to digitization. 
The specific needs of Arctic regions arise from limitations in terms of critical mass and human 
capital, as well as from long distances and dispersed demographic structure, as the provision 
of services and transport connections entails higher costs than in central urban areas. 
Moreover, developments more typical for the North – such as data centres – often constitute 
a topic for inter-regional competition rather than collaboration. 
The two clear areas for Nordic and EU cooperation are e-services (including e-health) and 
providing broadband connectivity in Europe’s peripheries. 
E-services and e-health have been one of crucial elements of both EU programmes and 
Nordic cooperation. Further development of e-services in peripheral regions depends largely 
on public support. Arctic regions could serve as living labs for deployment of these solutions 
and technologies, with possibility for exporting them to other parts of Europe or other regions 
of the circumpolar North (see section 4.3. on the concept of Arctic Europe as a living lab). 
The success of e-services in the North depends on good broadband connectivity (Arctic 
Economic Council 2016). While Nordic region is relatively well-connected, the projects such 
as the proposed broadband cable between Helsinki and Kirkenes (Lipponen and Svento 
2016) could provide boost for all sectors (increasingly) relying on high-speed, reliable data 
connections. That includes data centres, cold climate testing facilities, extractive industries, 
logistic companies as well as small companies selling products and services online. The 
increasing reliance of northern communities on e-services, and especially public e-services 
including healthcare in remote areas, makes fast and secure connectivity an important social 
challenge. Moreover, there could be benefits similar to the effect the construction of data 
centres had on the economic diversity of south Norrbotten (where a number of IT start-ups 
emerged) (Warrenstein et al. 2016). Joint Nordic (NIB) and EU (EIB) financing of broadband 
projects could be considered.  
Furthermore, both the 2016 Joint Communication and the Finnish NCM Presidency 
programme highlight the importance of open data in research. Policy-makers could explore 
whether there are here any areas for strong cooperation. 
2.3.4. Tackling Border Obstacles 
While progress is being made on the existing border obstacles – through the Freedom of 
Movement Council and regional information desks – there is no Nordic mechanism to review 
new regulations or organizational changes that may have impact on cross-border labour 
market, services provision, or local trade.
29
 The EU, however, has taken a number of 
initiatives as regards tackling border obstacles. 
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DG REGIO is currently carrying out a Cross-border Review, commenced in 2015 and 
delivering results on the outcomes of border case studies in early 2017. The Review includes 
an inventory of critical border obstacles with examples of how these have been addressed in 
different parts of Europe.
30
 Diverging national legislations, incompatible administrative 
processes and lack of common territorial planning are identified as the main sources of 
obstacles across Europe.
31
 The Cross-border Review entailed a significant degree of 
cooperation between the NCM, Freedom of Movement Council and the DG REGIO, as well 
as Nordic actors taking part in stakeholder consultations.
32
  
The EU has set up also a more long-term mechanisms. For instance, a procedure for 
notification of new national norms related to products and information society is in place, 
identifying new obstacles even before they materialize.
33
 Similar effort could be pursued as 
regards various aspects of the freedom of movement at Nordic or EU level, taking into 
account the characteristics of sparsely populated regions. New regulatory proposals in Nordic 
states would be reviewed as regards their unintended impact on the freedom of movement. 
This could be applied more effectively also to new EU legislation.  
The “Growth from the North” report (Husebekk et al. 2015) puts emphasis on the 
establishment of borderless public services – including health, e-health, public safety services 
– to make living in the Nordic Arctic “secure and attractive”. Improved working methods and 
enhanced contacts between officials across borders, also at municipal level, are encouraged. 
The report emphasizes the role of local bottom-up initiatives of municipal authorities. EU and 
Nordic projects have constituted and could remain in the future important contributions to 
these enhanced interlinkages. 
As discussed above, lack of skilled workforce in specific industries, high unemployment and 
local mismatches between skills and needs of employers are among challenges in the North. 
Easing the mobility of workers across the Nordic Arctic is seen in the “Growth from the North” 
report as one of key responses. Proposed ways forward are: easing bureaucratic burden (as 
in border obstacles discussed above), harmonizing education and qualification standards, 
mutually recognizing qualifications, facilitating common pull of talent, as well as advancing 
language skills, especially Scandinavian languages in Finland (Husebekk et al. 2015). 
Authors advocate innovative solutions towards increased mobility (e.g. encouraging 
participation in job fairs across borders). The increased exchange of students and 
researchers, boosted by joint study programmes, is also seen as a strategy for building a 
common labour market in the long-term. EU mobility programmes are already used to 
facilitate such activities. EU and Nordic funding could therefore contribute to the joint 
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hindered freight transport at Haparanda and Tornio terminals, inefficient mobile phone network on the border, 
different emergency legislations on blue light transports (European Commission DG REGIO website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/cooperation/european-territorial/cross-border/review/#3). 
32
 Personal communication, DG REGIO staff members, January 2017; see also Norden website at 
http://www.norden.org/sv/aktuellt/nyheter/europeiska-kommissionen-dg-regio-besoekte-graenshinderraadet-foer-att-
diskutera-graenshinderarbetet-i-norden  
33
 Technical Regulation Information System (TRIS) was established in order to prevent creating new barriers in the 
EU/EEA internal market, before these barriers materialize. TRIS also allows stakeholders to acquire information 
about new regulations and participate in the procedure. Under Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of 
technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services (Text with EEA relevance). 
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programmes and northern university cooperation proposed in the 2016 Joint Agenda 
between Arctic Europe universities. 
The 2016 Joint Communication states that the EIB can invest in cross-border projects 
between Finland, Sweden and Norway if these have “significant development potential”. 
Success of some of these projects – especially when they involve SMEs and cross-border 
services – depends partly on the overcoming of border obstacles, for which Nordic 
cooperation has assumed primary responsibility. Complementarity of these actions should be 
highlighted at the EU level. 
2.3.5. Making it easier for the Sámi to live as one people across Nordic states 
As discussed in the section 2.1.4., the Nordic cooperation venues have been critical for Sami 
cooperation across state borders. At the same time, EU programmes have provided 
important funding for pan-Sámi cooperation across Nordic states and Russia. Sámi 
institutions have over the years participated in numerous projects focused on culture, 
education and entrepreneurship. A good examples are two Interreg North/Sápmi projects 
dedicated to indigenous entrepreneurship (Indigee and Indigee2
34
), which were also co-
funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers. 
Importantly, the EU has endorsed the main international indigenous rights documents, 
including the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007). Art. 36 of 
UNDRIP provides specifically for rights of peoples divided by state borders, that is „the right 
to maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including activities for spiritual, 
cultural, political, economic and social purposes”. Both Nordic cooperation frameworks and 
the EU (due to its regulatory impact on the region) have obligation to support the Sámi in 
overcoming the impact of borders on their life as one people.  
The current division of funding priorities entails that the Nordic cooperation venues focus 
primarily on cultural and identity aspects, while the EU programmes contribute to pan-Sápmi 
entrepreneurship and business opportunities (notwithstanding, many EU programmes 
provide resources for cultural activities). While the 2016 Joint Communication does not 
mention Sámi issues specifically, it commits to dialogue and work with indigenous 
communities on climate change impacts and adaptation. That could be a potential future area 
for EU contribution. 
Should the Nordic Sámi Convention be ratified by the three Nordic states, the EU funding 
programmes to support Sámi cross-border cooperation may play a role in strengthening 
multidimensional trans-border activities, which could receive a boost following the successful 
ratification of the NSC. 
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 See Interreg IV Nord website at http://2007-2013.interregnord.com/en/projects/sapmi/4-sapmi-borderless-
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2.4. Common instruments 
Policy formulation and regulatory changes in the EU are already taken into consideration in 
the work of the Nordic Council of Ministers.
35
 That has been recently enhanced in the years 
of service of Dagfinn Høybråten as the NCM Secretary General, who was mandated to 
strengthen the linkages of NCM’s work with European and global developments. 
The 2016 Communication highlights the role of lending as a financing instrument in the EU’s 
support for sustainable development of the region. Nordic countries decided that the Nordic 
Investment Bank should provide financing for projects that support their Arctic strategies. 
Similarly, it may be feasible for the European Investment Bank and the European Fund for 
Strategic Investments (or its potential successor) to assign a pull of resources for facilitating 
the implementation of the EU Arctic Policy priorities (or the key investment and research 
priorities).  
Should a set of overall investment and research priorities be adopted and endorsed by the 
Nordic cooperation (see Part 3), these priorities or a common framework strategy could serve 
as basis for joint financing projects between Nordic and EU financing institutions. 
A possibility for joint EU-Nordic seed money facility for all programmes operating in Arctic 
Europe could be considered (see section 3.6.2. for discussion). Also, joint EU-Nordic 
conferences could be a way to bring together various programmes. The 2016 Joint 
Communication envisages annual Arctic stakeholder conferences, which could constitute a 
basis for such a Nordic-EU meeting place. 
In the NCM, there is currently an apt opportunity for finding synergies and complementarities 
with the Arctic-relevant actions at the EU level, as the NCM works on the new Arctic 
Cooperation Programme for 2018-2021. The NCM is, among others, exploring how a broader 
spectrum of economic opportunities in the Arctic – beyond large-scale resource extraction – 
could be supported by the NCM funding.
36
 This creates potential for alignment with the EU-
Arctic Stakeholder Forum process, which is likely to partly cover similar development 
trajectories. Discussed above bioeconomy, circular economy, climate technologies and 
digitization are among areas for growth alternative to the reliance on extractive industries. 
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 Personal communication, Nordic Council of Ministers Senior Advisor, Secretary General’s Office, January 2017. 
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3. STRATEGY AND COORDINATION: ARCTIC 
STAKEHOLDER FORUM AS A CATALYST FOR A 
COMMON ARCTIC EUROPE STRATEGY 
3.1. STRATEGY AND COORDINATION: Key ideas 
1. Many experts and stakeholder call for developing a common strategic framework covering 
Arctic Europe. It would influence EU funding and create linkages to non-EU forums (primarily 
the NCM and cross-border committees). The EU-Arctic Stakeholder Forum process can be 
used to develop the core of such a strategic framework (i.e. key investment and research 
priorities).  
2. There are good reasons for using elements of the smart specialization concept and 
methodologies for developing strategic framework for Arctic Europe. This should entail a 
clear idea how stakeholders from the Arctic Europe regions could attain a better position 
within European and global value chains. However, a full-fledged common smart 
specialization strategy for Arctic Europe is unlikely. The framework should neither take a 
format of EU macro-regional strategy as it may be inappropriate for the region’s needs. The 
development of the strategic framework should be driven by the northernmost EU/EEA 
regions. 
3. The continuity in applying the smart specialization concepts in the EU’s regional policy 
should be advocated during the current cohesion policy discussions. Smart specialization 
logic and methodologies appear to be well-suited to the peripheral and sparsely populated 
regions’ planning needs. 
4. When adopted, strategic Arctic Europe priorities should be gradually incorporated into 
regional, national and EU policies and programmes.  
5. The cooperation between EU programmes operating in the North is needed and in the 
future should build on the current cooperation network among programme managers 
established under the Northern Periphery and Arctic (NPA) Programme. The process 
implemented by the NPA secretariat should be strongly supported. Future cooperation 
elements could include: exchange of experiences in monitoring, common indicators, linking-
up projects funded by different programmes, and setting common goals for different forms of 
intervention. The cooperation mechanisms should largely remain informal and flexible. No 
new structure for coordination should be created. Annual stakeholder conferences could be 
used to maintain this cooperation.  
6. Arctic Europe Seed Money Facility could be established, whatever is the final format of the 
key investment and research priorities proposed by the Arctic Stakeholder Forum. The facility 
would support the development of project proposals contributing to the goals of strategic 
framework or to the key investment and research priorities. This would enhance 
implementation of priorities as well as strengthen the role of actors lacking resources to 
develop strong proposals. Set up under one of the EU funding programmes - possibly 
Interreg North or the NPA – the facility would support networking, project preparation or pre-
feasibility studies for proposals under all EU programmes operating in the Arctic Europe as 
well as non-EU programmes, such as the NCM or cross-border committees funding. A joint 
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Nordic-EU seed money facility covering all funding sources in Arctic Europe should be 
considered. National, Nordic and regional funding should contribute to the budget of such a 
facility. 
7. In order to facilitate sustained exchange between Nordic forums (in particular the NCM and 
the relevant cross-border committees) and the EU programmes and policy-makers, it should 
be considered whether the idea of the future annual stakeholder conferences (proposed in 
2016 Joint Communication) could be expanded into joint EU-Nordic Arctic conferences. 
3.2. Rationale for a common strategic framework 
The EU-Arctic Stakeholder Forum (ASF) is the most significant new EU initiative envisaged in 
the 2016 Joint Communication. There is a possibility to use this venue to bring together EU 
funding programmes and Nordic cooperation forums. It is here argued that a common 
framework strategy for the Arctic Europe could be a feasible way of achieving that aim and 
the ASF could be a good start for the process of formulating such a strategy, which would go 
beyond the EU funding programmes and include Nordic cooperation.
37
 The term “strategy” 
used in this section should not entail establishing a macro-regional strategy for Arctic Europe, 
similar to those formulated for Baltic Sea or Danube regions.  
Various regional actors
38
 as well as the initial drafts of the ongoing OECD study
39
 suggest 
that Arctic Europe would benefit from a common strategic framework, plan or work 
programme. Moreover, the former Prime Minister of Finland, Paavo Lipponen, in his 
September 2015 memorandum to the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker 
(Lipponen 2015) proposed the formulation of the “EU Arctic and Northern Policy”, 
encompassing all policy spaces and frameworks: 
“The EU should develop a Northern Policy, covering the whole Northern 
Dimension area from Greenland to North-West Russia to Northern Germany 
and Poland. Such a policy should cover all Northern European international 
institutions: Arctic Council, Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Council of Baltic Sea 
States, Nordic Council and Council of Ministers and Northern Dimension 
Cooperation.”  
The 2016 EU Arctic communication has opened a possibility for bringing together various 
programmes operating in the European North, although excluding Baltic region programmes 
(as proposed by Lipponen). The Arctic Stakeholder Forum process launched by the 2016 
Arctic Communication is to produce a set of overarching “key investment and research 
priorities” for the (European) Arctic. They could be, in principle, applicable to the existing EU 
funding programmes (for the post-2020 financial perspective): structural funds channelled 
through national and regional programmes, including European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
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 The idea is based on the results of a workshop during the Arctic Innovation Camp taking place in Rovaniemi, 16-
19.11.2016 
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 Based on interviews with officials from regions, secretariats of North Calotte Council and Tornio Valley Council, 
regional offices in Brussels, managers of EU programmes, as well as outcomes of the so-called Bodø process as 
reported by the University of Strathclyde (Gaskell 2014), discussions at the Arctic Innovation Camp in Rovaniemi 16-
19 November 2016 (see University of Lapland website at https://www.ulapland.fi/EN/Events/The-Value-of-the-Smart-
Specialisation-Strategy-%E2%80%93-Beyond-the-Boundaries-in-the-Northernmost-Europe/Arctic-Innovation-Camp). 
39
 Personal communication with representatives of the Brussels offices of the NSPA regions as well as discussions at 
the Mikkeli NSPA Forum (10 June 2016) and Arctic Innovation Camp (Rovaniemi, 17 November 2016) as regards 
the results of 2017 OECD study “Territorial Reviews: Northern Sparsely Populated Areas” (finalized as of January 
2017, to be published in March 2017). 
  
 
41 
(EMFF), cross-border and interregional cooperation, research funding, programmes such as 
Life, as well as investment loans distributed by European Investment Bank (incl. European 
Fund for Strategic Investments EFSI or its potential post-2020 successor). Investment and 
research priorities developed by the ASF could, however, also constitute a core of a broader 
plan involving Nordic cooperation frameworks as well as regional and national actions. 
Arctic Europe is a distinct region with distinct challenges, which justifies a separate strategy 
for the region. While Arctic Europe is covered by the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
(EUSBSR), few actors from the North participate in Baltic programmes. Among reasons 
could be lack of awareness of funding possibilities as well as limited interest in North-South 
partnerships, as the primary focus is on creating networks in the North.
40
 The partnerships in 
the North are fairly well-established and the competition for funding in the Baltic Sea Region 
is often greater than in Arctic Europe. Moreover, Arctic Europe cooperation requires direct 
involvement of Norwegian partners, who are present in the EUSBSR as neighbours rather 
than full participants.   
As discussed in parts 1 and 2 of this study, there are a number of similar challenges or a 
potential for various common solutions, including cross-border services, e-services, pan-
Nordic Arctic logistics, transport, and waste management. There is already a generally 
similar understanding of the problems, challenges, obstacles and opportunities across 
the region (see part 1). The need for enhanced cooperation between programmes stems 
also from the circumstances prevalent in the region: limited number of potential partners for 
particular thematic lines of projects and small size and limited capacity of many organizations 
(e.g. those of the Sámi or local SMEs).
41
  
Strategy-drafting would be create an opportunity to gain a more holistic outlook at the 
regional development in Arctic Europe. Priorities constantly change over the years and 
strategy documents have limited influence on actual developments. However, the process of 
discussing, aligning actions, bringing closer the way of thinking is a value in itself. Common 
strategy could have a potential to bring the Arctic discussion on opportunities and challenges 
closer to regional and municipal level.  
While there is interest in dialogue between different funding frameworks and programmes 
within and outside of the EU, including NCM, Barents Region projects, cross-border 
committees and national projects, there is little enthusiasm for coordination of different 
programmes.
42
 Each body wants to keep its own autonomy and be free to establish own set 
of priorities.  
Therefore, an appropriate solution could be a bottom-up, regions-driven approach. A 
common Arctic Europe strategy could be used by regional programmes and bodies as they 
could draw on the priorities as well as build on the priorities as spaces for cooperation 
between programmes. However, different actors would not be forced to participate in a 
coordination framework that overrides their own goals. The main way such a strategy would 
influence Arctic Europe developments would be through incremental incorporation of its 
                                                          
 
40
 Partly based on personal communication with a Norwegian representative in the Monitoring Committee of the 
Baltic Sea Region Programme, January 2017. 
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 On the other hand, there may be a certain degree of long-term cartelization in relations between programme 
authorities and some beneficiaries, as close connections are established and the number of trustworthy project 
partners is limited (Gaskell 2014). 
42
 Personal communication, officials from the Nordic Council of Ministers (January 2017), North Calotte Council 
(September 2016), European Arctic regions (June, August, October, November 2016), Brussels offices of the NSPA 
regions (June and November 2016), as well as managers of EU programmes (November 2016). 
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priorities and goals into regional, national and EU policies, funding programmes as well as 
concrete investment decision-making. 
3.3. Format for a common strategy: smart specialization 
rather than a macro-region 
The overarching programme or strategy should be long-term, flexible and owned at the 
regional level. Striking a balance between concrete actions and vague priorities (to which 
most actors easily agree) is crucial. If a common strategy remains excessively general and 
vague and is drawn without broad participation, it risks becoming another abstract “wish list”. 
That is why elements of smart specialization concept could constitute a basis for strategy-
drafting. 
Since 2009, the concept of EU macro-regional strategies have been implemented for 
Baltic, Danube, Alpine and Adriatic and Ionian regions. In December 2016, the assessment of 
implementation and added value of these four strategies have been published (European 
Commission 2016). Despite being advocated at national or regional level, so far the 
strategies have been criticized for engaging too much national and regional resources, while 
producing rather limited outputs (see also, e.g., European Commission 2013). 
For the European Arctic, the macro-regional strategy format could be inappropriate as it 
would cover areas of only two EU member states, one EEA state (Norway), with only limited 
participation of neighbouring regions. It would be desirable to involve Russia and the 
experiences of EUSBSR have shown difficulties in that regard. Moreover, the main rationale 
for macro-regional strategies in other parts of Europe is bringing together richer and poorer 
EU Member States and EU regions.
43
 Arctic Europe regions are among wealthier parts of the 
EU and in the last decades there has even been a degree of economic convergence between 
these different parts of Arctic Europe. Moreover, the EUSBSR already includes big part of 
Arctic Europe. There is little benefit in excluding regions of the northern Gulf of Bothnia from 
the EUSBSR or in creating an overlap. 
Instead, the format of the overarching common strategy could incorporate the key elements 
of smart specialization concept, as all EU regions have adopted smart specialization 
strategies.
44
  Smart specialization requires EU Member States and regions to focus their 
efforts and resources on a limited number of ambitious yet realistic priorities, where they 
would be able to build excellence as well as compete within the global economy in 
(financially, socially and environmentally) sustainable manner. When implemented, smart 
specialization strategies are expected to allow Member States and regions to strengthen their 
research and innovation systems, maximise knowledge flows, absorption and utilisation as 
well as spread the benefits of innovation throughout their economies.
45
 
The smart specialization concept appears to be particularly well suited to the circumstances 
of remote, sparsely-populated regions.
46
 These areas have much potential, but human, 
financial and institutional resources are limited by permanent geographic and demographic 
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 Based on the discussion with the representative of the DG REGIO, phone, 15.12.2016. 
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 Personal communication, officials from the Lapland Regional Council, October 2016.  
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 S3 Platform website at http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/value-chains  
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 Personal communication, representatives of the Brussels offices of the NSPA regions as well as discussions at the 
Mikkeli NSPA Forum (10 June 2016) and Arctic Innovation Camp (Rovaniemi, 17 November 2016) as regards the 
results of 2017 OECD study “Territorial Reviews: Northern Sparsely Populated Areas”. 
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characteristics. Critical mass is difficult to achieve for private and public actors. Limited 
availability of public funding and private capital allows to focus only on a few carefully chosen 
priorities that entail particular innovation potential and added value in regional context. As all 
Finnish and Swedish regions developed smart specialization strategies, they may constitute 
an appropriate starting point for the development of a common framework. 
If smart specialization concept is a basis for the overarching strategy, it would be 
disadvantageous if the next EU financial perspective moved away from the smart 
specialisation framework. Continuity in EU policies as regards the overall smart specialization 
logic would be required. 
The overarching strategy should be Arctic-specific and Arctic-oriented; this means that it 
should focus on characteristics and needs of sparsely populated northern regions and link up 
the smart specialization priorities to the developments unfolding in the Circumpolar Arctic.  
3.4. Content of the common Arctic Europe strategy 
Ideally, an Arctic Europe common strategy would be driven by regions and key actors in 
Arctic Europe, such as Sámi Parliaments, chambers of commerce, or cross-border 
committees. Participation of EU and national policy-makers would be crucial. While 
maintaining strong Nordic ownership, the Russian authorities at regional level could be 
consulted.  
The strategy should be based on a set of common broad values and concepts, including 
sustainable development, green growth, climate resilience and adaptation, and circular 
economy. It should respond to the critical long-term common challenges (listed in Part 1 
of this study): accessibility and connectivity, the diversification of Arctic Europe economy, 
bringing refining up North, avoiding duplication of efforts and creating critical mass in the 
North in business, academia and public investment. 
It is likely that the common strategy would in the beginning constitute the lowest common 
denominator among regional and national development plans. In the course of its evolution, 
synergies and common spaces for investment could emerge. 
Northern regions compete with each other for investments and funding. For sectors such as 
cold climate testing or data centres, the investment in one region have so far brought 
relatively limited benefits for other Arctic Europe regions. There are, however, sectors such 
as tourism, elements of circular economy or bioeconomy, where more pan-regional 
approach may have clear advantages. Currently implemented project Visit Arctic Europe
47
 
is a premier example of an action where a joint strategy and branding is expected to bring 
benefits for all parts of Arctic Europe.
48
 Projects on waste management (mentioned in section 
2.2.1.) or “Arctic foods” are other areas where joint marketing, technological exchange and 
even logistics could bring benefits. 
The regions and Nordic states should also consider how to utilize each other’s growth 
areas. The report “Growth from the North” emphasized the need for regions to take 
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advantage of opportunities arising elsewhere. Companies and workers from northern Finnish 
and Swedish regions could utilize the developments taking place in North Norway. So far, the 
focus has been mainly on hydrocarbon developments and construction. For many decades, 
workers moved to North Norway from neighbouring regions also in order to work in fisheries 
industry. It is time to expand these interlinkages. Currently, the vibrant development of blue 
bioeconomy in Troms county could create opportunities for companies across Arctic Europe. 
Ways to utilize booming tourism in Finnish Lapland by neighbouring regions are already 
sought (ref. “Visit Arctic Europe” project). Lapland could seek ways to take advantage of data 
centre boom or the space industry development in neighbouring Norrbotten. Cross-border 
clusters are one way to achieving such synergies. 
Bioeconomy, circular economy, material flows, and tourism create opportunity for building up 
Arctic Europe cross-border clusters, comprised of private sector, research institutions and 
regional administrative bodies. Their viability, however, will depend on tackling border 
obstacles, avoiding inter-regional competition, on the availability of funding for networking, 
and most of all, business feasibility. Over the last decade, a vast number of Northern 
Periphery Programme and currently NPA, Interreg North and ENPI/ENI Kolarctic projects 
have promoted networking between business actors and academia across the European 
Arctic.
49
 These networks often dissolve following the end of project funding. While they 
produced clear benefits in terms of exchange of experiences and even specific business 
partnerships, so far they have not resulted in the development of clusters spanning across 
Arctic Europe.  
The emergence of cooperation between Arctic Europe universities
50
 could be a good 
opportunity to facilitate the development of cross-border clusters. That depends on the 
success of joint educational and research programmes that are to emerge from this academic 
cooperation.  
In order to facilitate business and employment linkages and clustering, intra-regional 
transport connections are needed.
51
 For instance, Northern Ostrobothnia, Norrbotten and 
Troms have taken up the initiative by proposing and providing long-term financing for “Arctic 
Airlink”
52
 between Oulu, Luleå and Tromsø. However, so far the limited popularity of the route 
for many observers puts in question the viability of solutions relying on long-term public 
subsidies. Also “Visit Arctic Europe” project has identified lack of viable intra-regional 
connections as one of the key challenges in creating Arctic Europe-wide tourism offer.
53
 
Sparse population makes planning for pan-regional connectivity a major challenge, requiring 
joint strategy and long-term efforts. Transport of goods on the East-West axis across the 
region is not smooth enough for the needs of private sector.
54
 Improving logistics across 
Arctic Europe has been one of the key challenges and remains a priority for regional 
cooperation.  
Better positioning within global and European value chains is considered crucial for the 
success of northern sparsely-populated areas (Olsen et al. 2016), especially as these regions 
                                                          
 
49
 See websites of NPP 2007-2013 and Interreg 2007-2013. 
50
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are part of Nordic export-based economies. Emergence of cross-border clusters and the 
improvement of accessibility and connectivity are among actions that could lead to enhanced 
position of Arctic Europe regions in global value chains. Refining in the North, locally 
developed and applied technologies and innovations with export potential are often 
mentioned as most desirable developments in that regard. 
Currently, smart specialization thematic platforms have been put into operation in order to 
connect regions with similar or complementary development priorities. This could serve 
creating or strengthening European value chains, as well as building critical mass for 
European regions to successfully participate in global value chains.
55
 So far, three thematic 
platforms under smart specialization strategy have been established: energy, agri-food and 
industrial modernization. All three are potentially interesting for Arctic Europe. Within thematic 
platforms, stakeholders from the Arctic region could take the lead or participate in 
partnerships.  
The strategy should not only deal with the innovation in relatively new, growing sectors (e.g., 
ICT, bioeconomy, high-value food production) or in industries generating high monetary 
values (e.g. extractive industries, large-scale bioenergy/biofuels production or other heavy 
industry). Considering the profile of the region, it is necessary to include also traditional and 
more extensive sectors – such as reindeer herding, rural areas development or traditional 
handicrafts – and support their specific development trajectories. EU policies, and in 
particular the NPA, emphasize the need to support innovations in SMEs. The small-scale 
innovation and rural development are also at the core of the Lapland Smart Specialization 
Strategy (Regional Council of Lapland 2013b). 
In this context, Sámi traditional livelihoods and culture as well as Sámi specific cross-
border issues need to become an integral part of any common strategy. That is a challenge 
as often the Sámi – in order to maintain autonomy – prefer to outline their own concept of 
development rather than agreeing for their issues to become a part of regional planning. That 
is partly related to the existence of differences in development goals between the Sámi and 
majority society. These differences are often related to diverging interests, values and 
understanding of development. Nonetheless, even if a separate set of priorities is produced 
by the Sámi themselves, their concerns should still be taken into account when developing 
overall priorities for Arctic Europe. 
3.5. Utilizing the opportunity arising from the EU-Arctic 
Stakeholder Forum 
Through 2017, the EU-Arctic Stakeholder Forum (ASF) – likely under the informal leadership 
of the Northern Sparsely Populated Areas network – will explore possibility for identifying 
overarching key investment and research priorities. The first proposal for such a list of 
priorities – in yet unknown format – is to be put forward by spring 2017 in order to be 
presented at the open ASF meeting, which is to take place in June 2017. In order to have 
significant influence on the post-2020 planning for EU structural and investment funds at 
national level, as well as interregional/cross-border funding, the initial Forum’s outputs should 
be delivered even earlier, before the Cohesion Forum, which takes place in early June 2017.  
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Such a tight schedule makes it impossible to make the ASF a venue for developing and 
proposing a more comprehensive overarching strategy for Arctic Europe. However, the 
priorities produced by the Forum could constitute the core of the pan-regional strategy. 
The ASF work should consider European and global value chains as one of the key 
underpinnings of the discussion on common priorities. At the same time, the Forum and the 
annual stakeholder conferences that are to follow after the ASF closure, could be good 
places to establish value chain partnerships among Arctic Europe regions and between these 
regions and the rest of Europe. 
Developing a strategic framework requires human and financial resources. In the long-term 
perspective, the possibility to dedicate a relatively small amount of Interreg funding for the 
development of common strategy should be considered, similarly to funding lines available 
for macro-regional strategies. However, majority of needed resources would need to come 
from national and regional sources. In any case, currently the primary focus should be on 
delivering ambitious ASF outputs and supporting the NPA’s work on the network of managing 
authorities (another action proposed by the 2016 Joint Communication).  
3.6. Implementing Arctic Europe strategy  
The investment and research priorities or a broader common strategy will remain an abstract 
wish-list if they are not reflected in regional, national and EU strategies, programmes and 
funding decisions.
56
 Moreover, mechanisms promoting the overarching goals and priorities 
would need to be put in place.  
3.6.1. Long-term mechanism for cooperation among EU Arctic programmes,  
regional policy-makers and Arctic forums 
At the moment, “there is no overarching framework to facilitate collaboration and information 
exchange” among EU programmes operating in the North (van der Zwet et al. 2014). 
The resources available for cooperation between EU programmes as well as EU and other 
Arctic forums are limited. Therefore, the events organized by the EU – primarily Arctic 
stakeholder conferences planned from 2018 onwards – could be used for promoting and 
revisiting a common strategic framework.  
These events could also be utilized as a space for cross-presentation of regional 
strategies, creating an ongoing process in which regional authorities discuss their priorities 
and means of implementation. Bringing strategic planning in the regions closer together 
entails informing each other on the strategic goals, ideas, and the development trends. This 
would allow to consider how different regions could contribute to each other’s development. 
At the EU level, long-term cooperation between different EU funding instruments 
operating in Arctic Europe (Interreg NPA, Interreg North, Botnia-Atlantica, ENI Kolarctic, ENI 
Karelia, national and regional structural funding programmes) should be considered. EU 
programmes already cooperate via INTERACT,
57
 sharing methodologies, indicators, and 
                                                          
 
56
 Many Nordic Arctic regions are currently in the process of redefining their development goals. 
57
 INTERACT website at http://www.interact-eu.net/  
  
 
47 
programme management experiences. Regular exchange of information takes place also 
within European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) programmes for Russia (including Kolarctic 
and Karelia). Currently, the NPA Secretariat leads an effort – prescribed in the 2016 Arctic 
Communication – to bring together the managers of EU funding instruments operating in the 
North. The work of the network should be strongly supported and there are good reasons for 
making the cooperation mechanism into a long-term arrangement, based on the experience 
of the ongoing NPA effort. Establishing a specific priority axis in EU programmes for 
cooperation and strategic development should be considered.
58
 
The format of the possible long-term arrangement for coordination of various funds and 
forums for cooperation has been discussed in the past, primarily in the so-called Bodø 
Process, initiated originally by Norwegian regions. The process proposed a soft coordinating 
structure (ARC-NET, ARC signifying Arctic Regional Cooperation), based potentially in 
Tromsø. ARC-NET would support programmes in: programming (identifying common Arctic-
related themes and priorities), project generation (mobilization of applicants), project 
selection (lessons learnt, synergies between programmes), project follow-up and support, 
monitoring and evaluation (sharing methodologies and information, especially for monitoring 
of impacts on community level) (Gaskell 2014).  
The challenge for such a solutions is lack of willingness in the EU to create any new 
permanent arrangements.
59
 Therefore, the concept of an office or a hub may not be feasible. 
Moreover, there are already many venues for cooperation . There is significant personnel 
overlap in terms of participants to the meetings of various organizations. Also, the costs of 
cooperation in the North are relatively high due to long distances and high transport costs. To 
limit the costs, any new cross-cutting cooperation framework should utilize already existing 
informal contacts and arrangements. Therefore, the annual Arctic stakeholder conferences 
foreseen in the 2016 Arctic Communication could be used by all Arctic forums and councils 
as an appropriate venue for broader cooperation. Many elements of the ARC-NET proposal 
(Gaskell 2014) could become a content of these annual meetings. For instance, stakeholder 
conferences could become spaces for exchange of experiences, for discussing possibility 
for common indicators, and facilitating joint calls (see 3.5.3. below).  
3.6.2. Extending cooperation beyond EU programmes 
In drafting a common Arctic Europe strategy, cooperation with other northern forums and 
mechanisms – including four Northern Dimension partnerships, European Investment Bank, 
NCM, Nordic Investment Bank, Barents Euro-Arctic Region, and even Arctic Council – should 
be encouraged. Such cooperation should not entail forceful coordination of funding priorities, 
but rather exchange of ideas and experiences, as well as limited pulled funding. Primarily, 
this could be an opportunity to discuss the input of different frameworks into the 
implementation of the common Arctic Europe strategy (or key investment and research 
priorities).  
There is already a fair amount of synergy between EU and Nordic funding because the NCM 
funding distributed by cross-border committees (e.g. North Calotte Council) often provides 
own contribution necessary for obtaining EU funding. Other Nordic cross-border committees 
directly take part in EU projects (Bothnian Arc or Tornio Valley Council). Overlap between 
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officials engaged in cross-border committees and EU funds is the main way how EU and 
Nordic programmes are coordinated as regards avoiding overlaps and repetition of projects.
60
 
Exchange of experiences is possible also under the Northern Dimension, where the 
representatives of the Arctic Council, BEAC, NCM and the Council of Baltic Sea States 
attend ministerial and senior officials meetings.
61
  
There is willingness among various actors in Arctic Europe to establish closer linkages 
between existing cooperation forums,
62
 as long as their respective autonomy and own 
priorities are not compromised. In particular, cooperation should allow for exchange of 
information on strategic planning carried out under each of these forums/programmes. 
Currently, the flow of information to a great extent depends on personal overlap among 
national and regional representatives active in different cooperation structures. 
It could be beneficial if actors across the region consider whether the meetings of different 
cooperation forums – North Calotte Council, working meetings of Barents cooperation and 
the NCM, EU Arctic policy processes – could be organized in alignment with annual 
stakeholder conferences proposed in the 2016 Joint Communication. Such joint or back-to-
back meetings could increase participation, reduce costs and allow for better information on 
each other’s activities. EU and Nordic actors could consider developing annual stakeholder 
conferences into joint EU-Nordic Arctic conferences, with participation of the NCM and Nordic 
cross-border committees as well as EU programmes and policy-makers. 
3.6.3. Seed money facility  
A concrete way to advance the implementation of either the key investment and research 
priorities or a broader Arctic Europe strategy could be a mechanism supporting preparation of 
project proposals that contribute specifically to goals of a common strategy or constitute a 
reflection of investment priorities.  
Many programmes provide seed money or project preparation grants (NCM, NPA), but these 
in principle support proposals for specific programmes. In contrast, the Seed Money Facility 
in the EUSBSR supports proposal-drafting for any programme operating in the region, 
including Baltic Sea Region Programme, Horizon 2020, Life, etc.
63
 It provides seed grants for 
work on proposals that match priority areas or horizontal actions of the EUSBSR. 
A major advantage of seed money mechanism is engagement of actors who have expertise 
and potential but lack resources for preparing project proposals, for instance NGO sector or 
SMEs. Considering limited capacities of many organizations (e.g. Sámi organizations) and 
SMEs in the North as well as relatively high costs of networking in the northern sparsely 
populated areas, such a mechanism could prove highly suitable for Arctic Europe. For the 
EUSBSR, the Seed Money Facility has also an advantage of exposing the EUSBSR policy 
area coordinators (who pre-select proposals) to the specific ideas originating at the grass-
roots level. Both policy officials at macro-regional level and project participants value this 
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interaction.
64
 A similar instrument has been set up by the Swedish Institute for Swedish and 
Central-Eastern European partners around the Baltic Sea rim.
65
 
So far, very few actors from the EU northernmost regions applied for the EUSBSR seed 
money facility funding.
66
 One reason could be, as mentioned earlier, that some European 
Arctic actors do not see Baltic funding possibilities as relevant. 
A similar seed money facility could be established for Arctic Europe (possibly in the 
post-2020 financial perspective). Funding provided by the facility could cover activities such 
as networking, proposal-writing workshops or pre-feasibility studies. The proposals prepared 
with this support could be directed at any of the EU or partner-funded programmes or calls, 
including EU structural funds channeled through national and regional programmes, Interreg 
programmes, ENI programmes, research programmes, Horizon 2020 or Life. Moreover, the 
NCM’s and cross-border committees’ funding calls could utilize networks and proposals 
developed with the support of the seed money facility scheme. Flexible seed money facility 
promoting Arctic Europe investment and research priorities across different programmes 
could be therefore suitable for different levels: local, cross-border, transnational and national 
programmes. 
For the EUSBSR Seed Money Facility, the resources first came from the European 
Parliament’s technical assistance budget for strategy development. Now, the Facility has 
been relocated directly under the Interreg Baltic Sea Region Programme. Similar path could 
be followed in the North. Resources for such a facility could come from the technical 
assistance funding, possibly triggered by the European Parliament using technical assistance 
budget. If successful and supported by Nordic states and regions, the facility could be then 
moved for example to Interreg North programme. If key investment and research priorities or 
a common framework strategy are endorsed by the NCM, a joint EU-Nordic seed money 
facility could be considered. There would be a need for regional and national financing to 
make such a mechanism operational. In that case, it will be important to avoid the situation, 
where the final allocation of funding is based on region’s/state’s initial contribution to the 
facility’s budget. 
Seed money facility should enjoy simplified application rules in order to enhance participation 
of smaller organizations (see, e.g., van der Zwet et al. 2014). 
3.6.4. Interactions between individual projects 
Facilitating multi-fund projects clusters could be considered. Various forums and funding 
programmes contribute to one goal via their own priorities and areas of specialization. Bodø 
Process (van der Zwet et al. 2014) suggested joint calls among EU programmes or inter-
programme project clustering.
67
 Across Europe, some Interreg programmes have already 
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started investigating possible complementarities between projects funded by different 
programmes, included Baltic Sea Region and North-West Europe programmes.
68
 
The cooperation among programmes – as currently developed in practice under the NPA 
network of programme managers - could serve as a “platform to bring together potentially 
complementary projects; [and a way to] encourage multi-fund projects which combine EU 
funding streams” (Gaskell 2014). Elements of such project clusters could be funded by non-
EU programmes, which could facilitate more tangible cooperation between the EU, the NCM, 
Nordic cross-border committees and BEAC frameworks. 
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4. IMPORTANCE: ENHANCING ARCTIC EUROPE’S 
IMPORTANCE FOR THE REST OF THE CONTINENT 
4.1. IMPORTANCE: Key ideas 
1. The perception of Arctic Europe resources as relatively more environmentally sustainable 
and extracted in a responsible way could constitute an added value for companies and 
consumers in Europe. Such branding, however, has to have strong anchorage in reality: both 
regulations/standards and industry practices. 
2. Arctic Europe should be presented as a space for investments of European companies 
who wish to develop more environmentally sustainable activities and base their operations on 
renewable energy (as has been the case with data centres). 
3. Solutions, technologies and services applied in Arctic Europe are already at the cutting 
edge of innovation. They should be promoted as benchmarks for environmentally sustainable 
and socio-economically feasible developments in sparsely populated and Arctic regions. 
4. European Arctic regions can be living labs for testing products and services, as well as for 
Arctic innovations. Green growth, low-carbon solutions oriented towards sparsely populated 
areas can be developed and tested in the region and then scaled up to the European level or 
shared across the circumpolar North. 
5. Low population density could be an asset in the European context as regards 
experimenting with innovative governance solutions. Many Arctic Europe challenges and 
problems require exploring innovative ideas; and thus, northern regions are likely to be 
flexible in applying policy measures.  
6. Vibrant societies and economies in Arctic Europe would enhance the EU’s soft power as 
regards collaboration with Russia and the EU’s participation in international Arctic 
cooperation. Arctic Europe would stand as an example that the EU’s policies, single market, 
standards and values contribute to sustainable, diversified and inclusive Arctic development. 
Successful sparsely populated areas can also serve as spearheads for rural revival, which is 
key to pan-European long-term economic and social stability. 
7. Arctic cultures and Arctic nature will remain key advantages of the North in the European 
context. Their protection and development are key to long-term position of northernmost 
regions as an integral part of Europe. 
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By highlighting the role of the European Arctic in the 2016 Joint Communication, the 
European Commission and the High Representative acknowledge the significance of the 
region for whole Europe. The region’s multidimensional importance for the EU as well as for 
European economic and social actors can be further promoted and strengthened.
69
 
Currently, the emphasis on the significance of Arctic Europe for the whole EU acquires a very 
practical dimension. With the United Kingdom leaving the EU and in light of ongoing pressure 
on lowering EU expenditure, the post-2020 EU budget is likely to be constrained. Arctic 
Europe belongs to relatively rich parts of the EU and there have to be strong arguments to 
maintain current funding levels. Moreover, as there is increased emphasis on investment 
financing via loans rather than direct programme funding, the region has to promote itself as 
a place where investments generate added value, attracting both public and private capital. 
4.2. Source of sustainably-extracted resources 
The 2016 Joint Communication emphasizes that “the EU is a major consumer of products 
coming from the Arctic states, such as fish products and energy”. The Communication 
reiterates the EU-Arctic nexus as regards resource consumption described by the EU Arctic 
Footprint and Policy Assessment report (Cavalieri et al. 2010). Many of these resources 
come from Arctic Europe, including forestry products (Finland and Sweden), gas and in the 
future oil (Norwegian and Barents seas), minerals such as iron (around 90% of EU iron 
production comes from Arctic Europe)
70
 (see, e.g., Stepien et al. 2014). The waters of the 
Norwegian exclusive economic zone and northern aquaculture provide Europe with valuable 
source of nutrition.   
For many companies and consumers, a more sustainable and responsible extraction of 
resource in the North could constitute an asset. Promoting European Arctic resource 
extraction as carried out in a manner relatively more responsible than in other parts of the 
globe constitutes an approach already visible, among others, in the Finnish research 
programmes, in Lapland’s smart specialization programme (Regional Council of Lapland 
2013b) or in the promotion strategies of Norrbotten’s mining industry. However, branding of 
northern extraction as responsible requires true commitment to highest environmental 
standards, adoption of technologies allowing environmental sustainability, as well as respect 
for other uses of land and for livelihoods, especially those of indigenous cultures. 
Renewable energy is growing across the region, especially regarding wind power 
installations. Arctic Europe has a high percentage of renewable energy generation and 
further investments may allow the region to contribute even more to the EU meeting its 
climate and energy policy goals. 
 
4.3. Centre for targeted innovation 
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In order to be economically successful in globalized economy, Arctic Europe needs to gain 
advantageous position within European and global value chains, The regions has to show 
itself as constituting an integral, valuable part of EU economy. Contributing to European 
economy as a source of raw materials may be insufficient to generate the needed high-
quality employment and may result in vulnerability to fluctuating demand for resources. That 
is why the focus in Arctic Europe is increasingly on innovation, bioeconomy, development 
and testing of cold climate technologies, as well as utilizing ICT and digitization opportunities 
(Stepien 2016). 
The 2016 Joint communication reads: “The European part of the Arctic […] has a significant 
potential to support growth in the rest of Europe.” The Northern Sparsely Populated Areas 
(NSPAs) network has for long argued
71
 that the northernmost EU/EEA regions have a great 
potential for innovation but full unlocking of this potential is hindered by characteristics related 
to sparse population, remoteness, distance from markets, transportation costs, human capital 
challenges and harsh climate. In particular, inter-regional and intra-regional accessibility and 
connectivity and supporting the emergence of critical mass are seen as ways to overcome 
these hindrances, including through EU policies and funding.  
Should the region’s potential be unlocked, Arctic Europe could contribute to European 
economic growth, by: 
 Constituting a resilient and developing part of European economy, contributing to 
national and EU economic output rather than being a region requiring on-going 
financial transfers from national capitals and from Brussels; 
 Creating space for profitable investments of European companies, especially those 
that wish to develop and utilize sustainable solutions and base production on 
renewable energy (e.g. following the model of northern data centres). The 2016 Joint 
Communication emphasizes that there are developments taking place in the Arctic 
(including Arctic Europe), where European actors can benefit as providers of clean 
technologies and environmentally sustainable solutions; 
 Providing Europe with high-quality bio-products. Such a goal is already an important 
element of regional development strategies in Arctic Europe. 
 Developing technologies, products and services (such as e-health, renewable energy 
solutions, energy efficiency, cold climate technologies) that can be utilized in other 
parts of Europe to boost growth and improve wellbeing. Recent development in these 
industries in Finland are good examples of this potential.
72
 
While there is little appetite for formulating “Arctic standards”, technologies, products and 
services developed in Arctic Europe could serve as benchmarks for green growth. Arctic 
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 For instance, researchers from the Lappeenranta University of Technology see potential for Finland to export 
smart grid electricity technologies, with Arctic dimension of Finnish economy allowing for development and testing of 
these solutions in peripheral, sparsely populated regions. At the same time, some of Finland’s wind power 
technologies are examples of export success. There is also much potential in Finnish space technologies. Finnish 
Funding Agency for Innovation Tekes has identified 80 new companies working on spare-related products, some of 
which are relevant for Arctic conditions (e.g. Iceye solutions that could be used in maritime shipping, natural resource 
extraction, forestry or environmental disasters). See Yle News website: “Smart grid electrical systems – a new export 
jackpot for Finland?” (Yle Uutiset, 17 January 2017) at 
http://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/smart_grid_electrical_systems__a_new_export_jackpot_for_finland/9406868;  “Wind 
power demand prompts Moventas to expand production” (Yle Uutiset, 24 January 2017) at 
http://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/wind_power_demand_prompts_moventas_to_expand_production/9419565; Space 
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Europe regions could set examples of best practices in environmentally sustainable and 
socio-economically feasible developments in sparsely populated areas and in cold (yet 
rapidly changing) climate. Companies based in Arctic Europe could indirectly benefit from the 
international perception of the region as being at the cutting edge of Arctic innovation. 
The above goals are already at the core of strategies aiming at improving the position of 
Arctic Europe in the European and global value chains. Making the region a source of 
commercializable technologies (cold climate technologies and e-services) could be an 
important part of these strategies in the long time perspective.  
4.4. Living lab / testbed 
The 2016 Joint Communication suggests that Arctic Europe could serve as an area where 
innovative technologies could be successfully deployed, with support of European Structural 
and Investment Funds and research funding. 
The concept of Arctic Europe becoming a testbed for innovative solutions has various 
dimensions: product testing, Arctic innovations, and governance experimentation. 
On a micro-scale, local conditions are already utilized to carry out winter testing of products 
(cars, tires, engines, materials, etc.) and cold-climate technologies. In recent years, testing 
industry in Finnish and Swedish Lapland has saw major growth and has generated high 
monetary value. Also services such as e-health could be tested in sparsely populated areas, 
where the needs are potentially particularly urgent (especially in smaller communities with 
relatively high number of elderly) but limited number of service users could makes some 
types of testing easier. 
In the long-term, Arctic Europe could serve as a first step in European companies’ expansion 
into the Circumpolar Arctic. European part of the North has well-developed infrastructure, 
access to highly skilled workforce and comparatively stable regulatory environment. This 
allows to safely test solutions that could be later deployed across Arctic regions. Possibilities 
include e-services and cold-climate technologies, small-scale circular economy solutions, as 
well as cold-climate-specific technologies for extractive industries.
73
 The potential for Arctic 
Europe becoming the first step for European companies in their expansion to Arctic markets, 
depends, however, on the overall economic and social developments in the Arctic. 
Third way Arctic Europe could benefit as a living lab is via governance experimentation. A 
comprehensive concept of testing social solutions before they are implemented on large 
national scales have been presented in the 2015 report “Design for Government” for the 
Finnish Prime Minister’s Office  (Annala et al. 2015). Conditions related to sparse population, 
small communities, as well as the flexibility of regional and local governments in applying 
policy measures make the region an interesting site for governmental experimentation.
74
 
Appropriate support for areas chosen as sites of experimentation would be required.  
4.5. Gateway to Russia and the Circumpolar North 
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Arctic Europe is the EU’s main bridge to the Arctic and one of the EU’s key linkages to 
Russia. The EU’s soft power in the North could be strengthened through the development of 
the EU’s Arctic regions. The success of Arctic Europe and the benefits these regions gain 
from being part of the EU, its single market and from the implementation of EU policies would 
enhance the credibility of the EU as an Arctic actor.
75
 
Nordic Arctic regions, cities and actors play leadership roles in cooperation in the Arctic. In 
order for the Nordic regions to play their role as the EU’s gateway to northwest Russia and to 
the Arctic, these regions need to boast vibrant innovative economies, showcase sustainable 
development pathways, solutions and strategies (e.g. circular economy solutions). They need 
to be areas where indigenous rights and cultures are respected. Thus, the Sámi and their 
livelihoods need to be fully integrated in sustainable development of the region. 
4.6. Successful sparsely populated areas as spearheads of 
successful rural revival 
Recent months and years proved to be a time of major political upheavals. Brexit, the election 
of Donald Trump in the USA and elections across Europe had their specific dynamics but 
shared a number of characteristics. According to some analysts
76
, one of these common 
factors had been the growing gap between large cosmopolitan liberal, economically vibrant 
cities and the thinning-out rural areas with struggling small towns. In the latter, people are 
often discouraged and disappointed with the current economic and political systems. The split 
between cities and the countryside becomes reflected in political behaviour, fuelled by 
detachment and resentment. The fruits of the post-crisis recovery, technological and social 
innovation, socio-cultural change appear to be concentrated in the cities. At the same time, 
many rural areas around Europe continue to experience consequences of changes in land-
based and extractive industries, such as agriculture and forestry, benefiting little from high-
end economic development of the cities. These dynamics appear to be global and likely 
affect also Nordic countries. 
Therefore, it is important that rural areas and small towns, including sparsely populated and 
remote areas, are not left behind in light of socio-economic changes. Investing in innovation, 
creating new economic opportunities, supporting transition, and building human capital are 
key to limiting gaps between cities and the countryside. Rural areas need to be an integral 
part of national economies, social networks and cultures.  
Global focus on the Arctic, high general levels of innovation, and active regional planning 
work could make rural Arctic Europe one of the places where successful rural revival occurs.  
4.7. Region’s cultures and environment 
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In addition to more tangible benefits, the North is a space of value for whole Europe in terms 
of cultural diversity and nature. Roughly one-third of Finnish Lapland is covered by protected 
areas including many Natura 2000 sites. Sparse population and remoteness are here a major 
asset as important European biodiversity hotspots and tourism destinations are located in the 
region. Arctic towns are vibrant with modern culture and design activities. Arctic Europe’s 
creative industries are part of the region’s potential for growth (Olsen et al. 2016; Petrov 
2014). 
The Sámi are the only indigenous people in the EU (not taking into account non-European 
territories). How the EU engages and responds to challenges faced by its own indigenous 
people is a hallmark of its capacity to promote indigenous rights in external relations, whether 
in the Arctic or in the Global South (especially via development cooperation).  
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